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Abstract: In recent years there has been a growing realization that there are significant problems with the
current bank risk-based capital guidelines. As financial firms have become more sophisticated and complex they
have effectively arbitraged the existing capital requirements. They have become so good at avoiding the intent
of capital regulation that the regulations have essentially ceased to be a safety and soundness issue for
supervisors and have become more a compliance issue. There is also a growing realization that bank regulation
must more effectively incorporate market discipline to encourage prudent risk management. One means
recommended to accomplish this is to increase the role of subordinated debt in the bank capital requirement.
Arguments have been made that this could lead to improvements in both market and supervisory discipline.
Although a number of such proposals have been made, there appears to be significant misunderstanding of how
bank capital requirements would be modified and what might be accomplished by the modification. On the one
extreme, some discussions of sub-debt seem to imply that merely requiring banks to issue debt would solve all
safety and soundness related concerns. At the other extreme are a series of questions that raise doubts as to
whether any change in the role of sub-debt could contribute toward safety and soundness goals.
The goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive review and evaluation of the purpose and potential
of subordinated debt proposals and to present a regulatory reform proposal that incorporates what we believe
are the most desirable characteristics of subordinated debt. The article is intended as a reference piece from
which readers new to the topic may find a thorough review of the issues, and others can draw on specific
aspects of the debate. Coverage includes (1) a discussion of the characteristics of sub-debt that make it
attractive for imposing market and supervisory discipline on banks; (2) explanation of how current regulatory
arrangements do not allow these features to be fully utilized; (3) discussion of the role of debt markets, equity
markets, and supervision in disciplining firm behavior, and how the use of sub-debt avoids many of the
problems associated with alternative regulatory proposals; (4) a review of the evidence on the extent of market
pricing and disciplining of risk imposed by holders of bank liabilities; (5) a review of some of the existing sub-
debt proposals emphasizing their differences and the reasoning for those differences; (6) a new regulatory
reform proposal which increases the role of sub-debt; and (7) a discussion of some of the standard questions
raised about sub-debt proposals and, when appropriate, explanation of how our proposal addresses these
concerns.
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In the early 1980s Paul Horvitz recommended that mandatory bank capital requirements,
which had been introduced in the U.S. only a few years previously, be modified to increase the
amount held in the form of debt. Since then several proposals have recommended that banks
increase reliance on subordinated debt (sub-debt) to serve the role of bank capital. Recent
responses to those recommendations include the expressed interest by financial regulatory
authorities in the U.S. [see Ferguson (1999) and Meyer (1999)], recommendations by academics
and regulatory scholars [see U.S. Shadow Regulatory Committee (2000) and Benink and Schmidt
(2000)], and the introduction of a bank regulatory framework in Argentina which has
characteristics similar to those suggested in recent sub-debt proposals [see Calomiris and Powell
(2000)].  More importantly, in the U.S. the 1999 U.S. Financial Services Modernization Act
(Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) requires large U.S. national banks to have outstanding debt that is
highly rated by independent agencies to fund expansion of financial activities into areas not
previously allowed. The Act also instructs the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a joint study of the potential use of sub-debt to protect
the financial system and deposit insurance funds from "too big to fail" institutions.
1
The argument behind proposals to increase the role of sub-debt in the bank capital structure
is the potential improvement in market and supervisory discipline over bank risk-taking activities.
 Although a number of such proposals have been made, there appears to be significant
misunderstanding of how bank capital requirements would be modified and what might be
accomplished by the modification.   On the one extreme, discussions of sub-debt seem to imply that
merely requiring banks to issue some debt would solve all safety and soundness related concerns. 
At the other extreme, are a series of questions that raise doubts as to whether any change in the role
of sub-debt could contribute toward safety and soundness goals.
The goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive review and evaluation of bank
capital reform proposals that incorporate a mandatory sub-debt component, and to present a new
proposal that we believe incorporates the most desirable characteristics of sub-debt.
As general background, in the basic model of financial intermediation, bankers purchase2
short-term funds in the marketplace and transform them into risky earning assets.  The risk of these
assets derives both from their maturities and from default prospects. Absent the safety net
(particularly deposit insurance) the providers of this funding are at risk.  Uninsured depositors as
providers of these funds can reduce their risk by evaluating the banks’ activities to insure that the
portfolio generated is of acceptable risk.  If the quality of the portfolio declines, or the capital,
which serves to absorb variations in income, decreases, the depositors will demand a higher
return on their investment commensurate with the increased risk; or will simply withdraw their
funds.  Banks, needing a steady flow of reasonably priced funds, have an incentive to maintain high
quality portfolios.
For numerous reasons, policymakers moved away from this market-driven environment and
introduced a bank safety net.  However, the presence of this safety net can sever the investor
relationship between the depositor and the bank, weakening market discipline. Without this
discipline, the risk-taking incentives of bank management and investors are distorted and increased
risk is likely to be incurred.
   For years, industry scholars argued that industry risk-taking was too far removed from this
market-driven model.  The resulting distortions were labeled moral hazard problems.
2 The
arguments intensified during the 1980s as substantial public funds were used to recapitalize the
S&L sector following depletion of its deposit insurance fund.  Indeed, during this period numerous
alternative means to increase reliance on market forces and market discipline were proposed.
3
To maintain social welfare, discipline not provided by the marketplace must be
supplemented or replaced via the supervisory process.   During the 1990s, discipline was imposed
primarily through supervisory oversight and through risk-based capital requirements.  In many
cases, however, depository institutions have employed methods that weaken the relationship
between capital levels and risk.
4  Indeed, in today’s markets there is little doubt that, particularly
at larger institutions, there has been a significant deterioration in this relationship.  As the bank’s
ability to measure and manage their risk exposures improved, their ability to avoid binding capital
requirements also improved. At the same time, as banks became more complex, supervising and
regulating banking organizations became more difficult.
5 Thus, once again there has been a call for
increased reliance on market discipline to augment supervisory discipline, particularly in3
overseeing the activities of large financial conglomerates.
With the growing interest in increasing market discipline, there have been a number of
proposals to increase the role of sub-debt in the bank capital structure.  Although the specifics of
these proposals differ, all rely on one or both of two arguments that sub-debt has desirable
properties for regulatory purposes.  One argument is that expanded use of sub-debt allows
regulators to require banks to have more private funds at risk without mandating that they adopt
ratios of debt-to-equity that place them at a competitive disadvantage.  Bankers have long
complained that regulatory equity capital requirements placed them at a competitive disadvantage
because, for example, the interest on debt is deductible but dividends to equity-holders are not. 
Expanded use of sub-debt may allow banks to choose their debt-to-equity ratios while assuring
regulators that at least a minimal amount of private funds are outside the safety net and are at risk. 
The other argument for sub-debt is that the risk signals from this debt more closely follow the
needs of the regulators. That is, both are concerned more with guarding against the potential for
bank failure than they are with the potential for higher profits from taking on additional risk.  In
contrast, equity-holders may gain from increased risk taking since they reap all of the profits and
do not bear all of the costs because the current pricing of the safety net is insufficiently sensitive to
changes in risk exposure.  Thus, sub-debt yields are likely to be more informative about a bank’s
risk exposure.
Authors of reform proposals generally agree that increasing the role of sub-debt in the bank
capital structure should result in greater discipline over the risk-taking activities of banks,
decrease potential losses to the deposit insurance funds, and, by having the debt-holders gradually
apply increasing pressure to the bank as its condition deteriorates, help manage the failure
resolution process when larger banks encounter difficulties.  However, there are differences in the
proposals based on the specific goals and objectives of the author. Some attempt to supplant
supervisory oversight while others strive to provide supervisors with an additional tool to enable
them to better supervisor banks.  Some rely on pressure being exerted on the bank by increasing its
cost of funding while others rely more on the signal sent by changing debt prices in the secondary
market.
A requirement for these proposals to be effective as a regulatory tool is that the debt-4
holders be capable of distinguishing between banks with different risk profiles.  Studies dating
back to the 1970s have evaluated whether various holders of bank liabilities price differences in
banks’ risk.  The majority of this literature suggests that liability holders do effectively price such
risk in the expected manner.  The exception to this finding concerns debt-holders at large U.S.
banks during the 1980s. This too, it is argued, can be explained by rational, informed behavior. 
During this period it was commonly believed that these investors fell under an implicit too-big-to-
fail guarantee.
6 Investors rationally expected to be protected from bank problems.  Thus, the
literature suggests that investors behave rationally and demand higher compensation from banks
when they are at risk of loss.
After a discussion of the relevant issues, we present a new sub-debt proposal that
incorporates many of the characteristics, and resulting advantages, of earlier proposals, but offers
some new characteristics that address specific regulatory concerns.  The timing seems particularly
good for consideration of such a plan as the U.S. Congress has expressed interest in the potential
merits of sub-debt as a regulatory tool.  Additionally, recognizing problems with the current Basel
Capital Accord, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is currently evaluating alternative
means to improve capital regulation to make capital more reflective of banks’ actual risk levels. 
In the U.S., banks as a group are relatively healthy which allows time for a carefully thought out
plan instead of quickly imposing a plan in response to a financial crisis.  Worldwide, there seems
to be the realization that regulators need to find means to avoid the financial crises seen in recent
years, and increased reliance on market discipline is gaining acceptance as a means to regulate
banks.
7 Sub-debt proposals seem to be gaining support as a preferred means to impose this
discipline.
In the remaining pages we provide a comprehensive review of issues associated with sub-
debt proposals.  The article is intended as a reference piece from which readers new to the topic
may find a thorough review of the issues, and others can draw on specific aspects of the debate. 
Readers most familiar with the topic may want to go directly to the new regulatory reform
proposal. The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we discuss the characteristics of
sub-debt that make it attractive for imposing market and supervisory discipline on banks and
explain how current regulatory arrangements do not allow these features to be fully utilized.  We5
emphasize the role of debt markets, equity markets and supervision in disciplining firm behavior,
and show how the use of sub-debt avoids many of the problems associated with alternative
regulatory proposals (such as elimination or significant reductions in deposit insurance). Since the
effectiveness of sub-debt proposals rely on the market’s effectiveness in influencing firm behavior,
in Section III we review the evidence on the extent of market pricing and disciplining of risk
imposed by holders of bank liabilities.  Section IV summarizes some of the existing sub-debt
proposals emphasizing their differences and the reasoning for those differences.  Our regulatory
reform proposal which increases the role of sub-debt is presented in Section V. Finally, for
completeness, in Section VI we address some of the standard questions raised about the sub-debt
proposals and, when appropriate, explain how our proposal addresses these concerns. The last
section summarizes.
 II SUBORDINATED DEBT AS THE PREFERRED MECHANISM FOR REIMPOSING
MARKET DISCIPLINE.
The problem of disciplining firm risk taking is not unique to banks. Ordinarily the focus in
evaluating risk taking is on the equity-holders’ incentives.  Limited liability, however, may
provide equity-holders with an incentive to have the firm take excessive risk, particularly when
equity is low.  This occurs because limited liability gives equity-holders almost all of the gains if
the risky investment pays off, whereas their losses are limited to the extent of their investment. 
Losses in excess of their investment are borne by the firm’s creditors.  This asymmetry in the
sharing of risks leads equity-holders to demand excessive risk.
8 Similarly, it leads debt-holders to
be more risk adverse.
If the desire is to rely on equity holders to impose discipline, the most straightforward
means to insure they do not have an incentive to take excessive risk is to require that the firm have
sufficient equity to absorb any potential losses.  In this case, the equity-holders would obtain all of
the benefits and, similarly, bear all of the costs of risks undertaken by the firm. The costs of all-
equity financing, however, are typically too high, and a firm will choose to issue debt to help
finance activities. The U.S. tax code heightens the advantages of debt financing by allowing the
interest expenses to be deducted as a business expense.
9 An important characteristic of debt in6
determining the degree of discipline that debt-holders can exert on the issuing firm is its maturity
structure. The shorter the maturity, the more discipline that can be imposed by either requiring
higher yields to rollover the debt or simply by refusing to roll it over.
10 Flannery (1994) and
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that portfolio composition, particularly, the opaqueness and
information intensiveness of the assets (particularly loans), leads banks to rely on lower capital
ratios and more short-term debt. This results from the dynamic characteristic of bank portfolios;
that is managers have the ability to quickly change risk profiles by altering asset composition.
Flannery emphasizes that high debt levels constrain managerial discretion in making investment
decisions. However, the high debt levels also afford managers a chance to own a larger fraction of
the equity, which increases their incentive to maximize shareholder wealth by increasing risk. The
combination of high debt levels with long-term debt would induce a strong preference for risky
projects on the part of management.  Shortening the maturity of the debt can reduce this incentive.
Thus, banks typically issue the shortest-term debt possible, debt that must be repaid upon demand.
  
The extensive use of short-term debt raises concerns about the stability of the financial
system.
11 Depositors, lacking full information about the quality of a bank’s assets may demand
repayment and make a bank illiquid even though it remains solvent.  Policy makers responded to
this concern and introduced a safety net in the form of deposit insurance, the discount window, and
payments system guarantees. While the bank safety net addresses liquidity concerns, it also distorts
behavior and alters the effectiveness of market discipline as it reduces incentives for depositors to
discipline banks through higher interest rates. In the absence of closure by the regulatory agencies,
depositories could, as some did in the 1980s, continue to operate and be primarily funded by
deposits even though they were insolvent; e.g., see Kane (1989).  Thus, instead of depositors
discouraging excessive risk-taking, they were essentially indifferent to it. Equity-holders at poorly
capitalized banks were put in a position that can be summarily described as “heads, I win; tails the
deposit insurer covers most of the losses.”
12     
Losses can continue to accumulate in this environment as long as the bank is allowed to
operate once it becomes insolvent.  This was a somewhat common occurrence in the U.S. in the
1980s, particularly in the Savings and Loan industry, as regulatory forbearance allowed losses to7
grow and be passed on to the deposit insurance funds. In response, in 1991 Congress adopted
prompt corrective action as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA).  The goal is to require banks to adhere to capital requirements by having progressively
stricter supervisory action as the ratio of capital to portfolio risk declines.  This action is triggered
in a stepwise fashion by declining bank capital-to-risk-weighted-asset ratios.
13 However,
weaknesses in both the numerator and denominator of this ratio raise concerns that, as currently
structured, prompt corrective action may be inadequate. 
One major problem with the current procedures, but one that can be relatively easily fixed,
is that the “triggers” are based on capital valued at book rather than at market-value.  A more
fundamental problem exists however in accurately measuring the riskiness of the bank and having
meaningful triggers to initiate the restrictions.  Although portfolio risk measurement, especially
estimating the probability of large losses, is difficult, banks are almost always in a better position,
vis a vis supervisors, to estimate that risk. As a result, they are positioned to exploit any
inaccuracies in the regulatory capital requirements.  Moreover, with the development of improved
risk management tools and more accurate internal models, banks are in a better position to
decrease over-weighted, and increase under-weighted risks; that is, to arbitrage or “game” the
capital requirements.
14
If under current regulatory procedures the safety net is creating moral hazard, and the
relationship between bank risk and the triggers used to initiate supervisory action is making the
prompt corrective action procedures less effective at resolving troubled institutions, then
alternative means to reduce these problems should be pursued. One potential method frequently
recommended is to reduce the safety net by severely limiting deposit insurance coverage.
15 The
U.S. has attempted to move in this direction with passage of prompt corrective action and the
least-cost resolution provisions of FDICIA, and the depositor preference provision as part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.  In theory these provisions make all other liability
holders junior to domestic deposits and limit deposit insurance coverage to the de jure coverage
limit of $100,000. These provisions should provide uninsured liability holders an incentive to
discipline troubled banks and force the closure of insolvent ones before they can generate large
losses.  As a result, this should further reduce the insurance fund’s expected losses. Additionally,8
the net effect of substantially reducing the safety net should be to decrease banks’ ex ante risk
exposure, and, hence, reduce their probability of failure.
Although curtailing deposit insurance may have substantial merits, it also has some
potentially significant drawbacks.  Banks, especially banks that obtain a large fraction of their
funding from retail customers, may reduce the effectiveness of ex ante discipline by reducing their
reliance on uninsured funds relative to insured funds, and by providing collateral to uninsured non-
depositor creditors.  Moreover, while explicit insurance coverage may be reduced, there are a
number of reasons to expect that total coverage may remain relatively high. The experience around
the world in recent decades has been that de facto deposit insurance exists regardless of the extent
of de jure coverage.  For example, in the U.S. the least cost resolution provisions of FDICIA
provide for what is commonly called the systemic risk exception.  The FDIC may nevertheless
cover losses to liability holders that are not covered by de jure insurance in an attempt to preclude
systemic problems.  Such coverage is possible if the Secretary of the Treasury, the FDIC Board
and the Federal Reserve Board concur that least cost resolution would “have serious adverse
effects on economic conditions or financial stability.” Implicit coverage may also be provided by
Federal Reserve discount window loans that provide banks with the funds needed to redeem
uninsured liabilities prior to closure.
16
Not only might implicit deposit insurance lead to more severe moral hazard problems, but
it may also induce government actions that could further decrease market discipline beyond what
an explicit deposit insurance system would.  Milhaupt (1999) reviewed the experience of Japan in
the 1990s; which had a very limited explicit deposit insurance system, but an implicit system
essentially promising 100 percent coverage of deposits.  He argues that the existence of the
implicit system of deposit insurance likely resulted in substantially worse outcomes than would
have an explicit system with more extensive coverage.  The major argument is that implicit safety
nets provide more scope for regulatory officials to make ad hoc decisions that appear optimal in
the short-run (during their tenure in office) but led to sub-optimal long-run outcomes.  In contrast,
an explicit safety net can be accompanied with explicit closure and resolution rules that provide
adequate weight to the long-run consequences of bank closure and resolution decisions.
17
Although least cost resolution and depositor preference may reduce moral hazard, their9
potential weaknesses suggest that regulators could benefit from another source of market
information and discipline.  Ideally, this alternative source could not be repaid by insolvent banks,
could not be collateralized, and would be highly unlikely to benefit from an ex post extension of
the safety net.  Liabilities that may meet these requirements are bond issues that explicitly state that
their repayment is subordinated to the payment of all other creditors and the FDIC; that is, sub-
debt.
From a regulatory standpoint, sub-debt has a number of attractive characteristics. One is
that the debt-holders would take the entire portfolio risk into account when pricing a bank’s risk
exposure and not, as is common under current supervisory procedures, emphasize individual asset
risks. Existing evidence, summarized in section III, indicates that sub-debt yields are sensitive to
the risk exposure of the issuing banking organization.   Therefore, the regulator could structure the
terms of qualifying sub-debt to make it homogeneous across firms so that the pricing of the debt
could serve as a signal of the financial market’s assessment of a bank’s risk.  Other market
participants could also use the debt pricing to obtain a low cost signal of the bank’s risk which
they could then use to determine if, and on what terms, they would contract with the bank. 
Additionally, as detailed below in our proposed sub-debt plan, supervisors could use information
from the sub-debt markets in the examination and supervisory process.
The existing capital requirements, however, hinder the use of sub-debt as an effective
source of market discipline.  Required characteristics for sub-debt to qualify as capital have been
imposed which attempt to essentially transform it into a cheaper form of equity.  For example, to
qualify as capital under the existing guidelines, the debt must have an original maturity of at least
five years and must be discounted on a straight-line bases when it has a maturity of less than five
years.  This effectively prevents distressed banks from having to redeem sub-debt that is being
counted as regulatory capital, but it also hinders the direct disciplining role of debt since the bank
does not have to approach the market very often.  Additionally, the regulators’ ability to use the
pricing of bank’s sub-debt to initiate prompt corrective action is inhibited by the lack of
restrictions on who may own the debt.  Currently it is common practice for banks to issue sub-debt
to their parent holding company.  Most large parent bank holding companies issue sub-debt to the
financial markets, but nothing in the current regulations prevent the parents from issuing the debt in10
a private placement under which the current yield on the outstanding debt would not be publicly
observable.
Although current restrictions on sub-debt limit its effectiveness as a capital source, on the
surface there appears to be three potential means by which sub-debt could be used to achieve
regulatory goals.  It could provide (1) a cushion to absorb losses and, thereby, reduce the expected
cost of failure to the safety net, (2) a source of direct discipline on the bank in the form of higher
funding costs, and (3) a source of derived discipline by providing risk signals to other market
participants and to supervisors who can then discipline the bank.  Whether sub-debt adequately
serves as a cushion to absorb losses depends largely on the size of the debt issues, and, when
appropriate, the type of funding source that sub-debt is substituting for.  Whether it provides direct
discipline depends on the extent to which the funding costs of banks are sufficiently affected by
introducing sub-debt requirements and, therefore results in a change in their risk-taking behavior.
This depends on the size of the debt requirement and the resulting degree to which the marketplace
prices the risk and disciplines the bank.  The extent to which sub-debt may be used to provide
derived discipline depends largely on whether its yield accurately reflects changes in a bank’s
riskiness and the extent to which it is used by supervisors and other market participants.
For both direct and derived discipline the market must be capable of distinguishing risk
differentials across banks and translating those into differential yields. Thus to be effective at
achieving regulatory goals, the characteristics of a sub-debt program must be carefully determined
to allow some combination of these three forces to operate.  We will return to what we believe to
be the preferred characteristics of a sub-debt program in a later section.  Next we evaluate the
evidence on whether the market is capable of differentiating riskiness across banks. 
III. SUBORDINATED DEBT PRICING AND DIRECT DISCIPLINE IN BANKING: THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
  Above we argue that there are potential benefits of moving to a regulatory regime in which
banks are required to issue sub-debt to have it comprise a significant portion of their capital. Many11
of these benefits occur because holders of sub-debt are likely to be at risk if a bank should fail,
and they have an incentive to demand compensation for that risk.  The demands for compensation
for risk bearing should exert direct discipline on banks and provide a risk signal.  These benefits,
however, exist only to the extent that holders of sub-debt effectively price the riskiness of the bank
in a manner suggested by economic theory. Therefore, before consideration can be given to
introducing a new sub-debt proposal one must evaluate whether holders of sub-debt can be
expected to demand a higher yield from riskier banks. Will investors gather information about a
bank's activities and prospects, and the current condition of the bank, and effectively incorporate
that information into the decision to buy and price that bank’s debt?  More generally, is market
discipline effective in banking? 
Here we summarize the empirical research on market pricing of risk and exerting of direct
discipline in banking.  We briefly touch on the pricing of risk in general, as revealed through
analyses of bank liability prices and deposit flows, and we then give a more detailed coverage of
the recent literature on sub-debt yields.
18  Most of the work on direct and derived discipline
focuses on the pricing of sub-debt, however there is some analysis of the resulting behavioral
changes of banks resulting from risk-related yield differentials. Finally we review the literature on
whether there is additional information in debt prices beyond the information set of bank
supervisors.
The most common empirical tests have analyzed the cross sectional relationship between
interest rates paid on bank liabilities (typically large, uninsured certificates of deposit) and
various measures of bank riskiness.  Using supervisory information on the riskiness of the firm
(e.g., CAMEL ratings), accounting measures or market measures of riskiness, most studies have
found rates to be positively and significantly associated with the risk measures.
19    Additionally,
the studies found that “bad” news was quickly incorporated into the cost of issuing large,
uninsured certificate of deposits (CDs).  In fact, even the largest banks, which many would argue
were too-big-to-fail, and therefore had liabilities essentially guaranteed by an implicit safety net,
were shown to have a risk premia embedded in the CD rates. Similarly, studies which have
viewed the relationship between deposit growth and portfolio risk have generally found a
relationship consistent with market discipline: uninsured depositors reduce their holdings at12
riskier institutions relative to those held at safer institutions. 
More relevant for our purposes, however, is an assessment of the evidence of market
pricing of risk and exerting of direct discipline in the market for sub-debt issued by banking
organizations. We divide these studies into two groups.  The early studies tested the relationship
between the interest rate premium (defined as the rate on sub-debt minus the rate on long term U.S.
Treasury securities) and various risk measures derived from balance sheets and income
statements; e.g., leverage ratios, measures of profit variability, and loan loss ratios.  These studies
evaluated the pre-FDICIA period and did not find a significant statistical relationship between risk
and the expected return demanded by investors.
20
More recent research, however, analyzes data for a longer time period and generates
results consistent with the earlier findings, and consistent with the market pricing of risk in the sub-
debt market.  Flannery and Sorescu (1996) argue that the apparent lack of relationship between
risk and sub-debt yields in the earlier studies was most likely a result of conjectural government
guarantees during the 1980s.  This perceived guarantee was re-enforced by the regulatory
treatment of holders of sub-debt during the rescue of Continental Illinois National Bank, and the
formalization of the too-big-to-fail provision by the Comptroller of the Currency in Congressional
testimony.  The market clearly believed that banking policy would at least partially protect the
owners of banks during this period.  Being senior to bank equity, sub-debt-holders could have
rationally believed that they were protected as well.  This implicit guarantee lasted until the late
1980s.
The implications of this perceived guarantee are that the degree of evidence concerning
market pricing of risk in sub-debt markets should vary over the pre- and post-FDICIA period. 
Market pricing of risk should be more apparent in the latter portion of the period as Congress
passed legislation (FIRREA and FDICIA) which was explicitly directed at curtailing these
guarantees.  Indeed, Flannery and Sorescu found bank-specific risk measures to be correlated with
option-adjusted spreads in the 1983-91 period for a sample of 422 bonds issued by 83 different
banking organizations.  Further, this correlation appears to have increased as conjectural
government guarantees weakened in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Despite this trend, however,
option-adjusted spreads on sub-debt may also reflect the market's bank-specific estimate of a13
government bailout. The primary empirical model contains the log of bank assets as an explanatory
variable and it is statistically significant in six of nine years in their sample, sometimes at the one
percent level.  This variable could indicate that the other balance sheet variables overstate the risk
borne by sub-debt holders because these banks are safer (better diversified, or better managed) or
because the conjectural guarantee is of greater value to large banks, or both.  The paper addresses
the conjectural guarantee issue more directly by replacing the log of total assets, with a binary
variable for inclusion on either the Comptroller's list or The Wall Street Journal's list of too-big-
to-fail banks [see Carrington (1984)].  The binary variable is negative and statistically significant
at the 10 percent level in explaining option-adjusted spreads on their sub-debt in 1985-87 and in
1991. However, this binary variable does not exclude the possibility that balance sheet variables
overstate the risks of banks on too-big-to-fail lists because these banks are more diversified or
have better managers. Thus, based on these findings, it appears that bank sub-debt market
participants are willing to invest in evaluating bank-specific risks when it is clearly in their
interests to do so. 
DeYoung, Flannery, Lang and Sorescu (1998) reaffirmed the results of the Flannery-
Sorescu analysis over the 1989-95 period.  This is valuable information because the earlier study
had a relatively few number of years for inclusion in the post too-big-to-fail period.  Over this
longer period, without the presence of a conjectural government guarantee, spreads were found to
be closely related to balance sheet and market measures of bank risk.
21
Although the required sub-debt proposals have typically focused on individual banks, the
studies discussed above have by necessity focused on sub-debt issues of bank holding companies. 
Until very recently almost all publicly traded debt was issued at the bank holding company level.
Since problems at a bank holding company's bank affiliate can affect the profitability and value of
the organization, there are incentives for investors to put pressure on the bank holding company to
resolve these problems.  These incentives, however, are less direct than are the incentives for
investors that hold sub-debt that is issued directly by the bank; that is, the holder of bank holding
company debt has a claim on additional assets controlled by the holding company and a lower
priority claim on the bank’s assets.  Additionally, the strength of market discipline that is exerted
by sub-debt-holders may also depend on who the owners are. In the case of independent banks,14
discussions with bank supervisors suggest that “insiders” hold most of their sub-debt. Although
such debt does provide an additional cushion for the FDIC, it is not clear that these debt-holders
would have risk-preferences that are closely aligned with the risk-preferences of the deposit
insurer.  Nor is it obvious that they would have the incentive to pressure regulators to intervene
promptly with capital deficient banks. If sub-debt was issued by a bank that was part of a bank
holding company, then it was typically held or guaranteed by the bank holding company itself. 
Such investors may not have the same incentives as would third-party investors when a bank was
under financial stress. 
One recent study evaluates publicly traded sub-debt issued both by bank holding
companies and directly by banks.  Analyzing sub-debt issues for 19 banks and 41 bank holding
companies over the 1992-97 period, Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (1999) attempt to contrast the
extent of market pricing of risk for two samples of debt issuers.  They find that the market prices
risk for both types of sub-debt about equally although bank holding company debt yields a higher
risk premium.  This reflects the lower priority on the bank’s assets in case of insolvency or, as
argued by others, is a result of the safety net being directed at the bank.
22  The important finding is
that under a number of alternative specifications the market did appear to impose a risk premia on
sub-debt issued at the bank level.  They also find that the market tends to price risk more severely
at poorly capitalized banks--that is, as predicted by theory, the spread-risk relationship is
nonlinear based on the capitalization of the bank.  This is important since most sub-debt proposals
require that the bank issue the debt.
Finally, Morgan and Stiroh (2000) analyze whether or not the market is “tough enough” in
pricing bank risk.  Evaluating new bond issues between 1993-98 they test to see whether debt
spreads reflect the risk of a bank’s portfolio; thus they are evaluating whether the market prices ex
ante risk.  They do similar analysis for non-banks to evaluate whether the risk-spread relationship
varies between the two sectors.  Finally, they evaluate subsamples of the bank data to see if the
“toughness” of the market differs across different sized banks. Their concern is that too-big-to-fail
policies may still result in the market being “easier” on larger institutions.
23
They find that the market does price risk exposure at banks.  As the bank shifts its portfolio
into riskier activities it is forced to pay greater spreads to investors. The risk-spread relationship15
is nearly identical across the bank and non-bank sectors. However they find that the risk-spread
relationship is weaker for the larger banks. One interpretation of this result, the one they provide,
is that larger banks are more likely to benefit from implicit guarantees. While there may be merit in
this interpretation, balance sheet variables could be poorer proxies for several other (non-mutually
exclusive) reasons including:  (1) balance sheets may comprise a smaller fraction of the available
information about larger banks because these banks appear more frequently in the news media and
are covered by more analysts, (2) larger banks may have a larger fraction of their earnings
determined by off-balance sheet items and non-traditional activities, such as securities
underwriting, and (3) loans within a given category may be less homogenous for some large banks
because of their greater involvement in foreign markets.  
In summary, the majority of the literature suggests that the market accounts for risk when
pricing sub-debt issued by banking organizations.  During those periods when sub-debt premia
was not found to be related to risk measures, there is significant evidence indicating that debt-
holders were not at risk in spite of the riskiness of the debt-issuing bank and were relying on the
government's conjectural guarantee.  As the guarantee was decreased via policy and legislative
changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, debt-holders came to realize that they were no longer
protected from losses and they rationally responded by more effectively taking market risks into
account. Therefore, sub-debt-holders appear to be willing and able to invest in evaluation of the
riskiness of bank assets, but only when they benefit from doing so.
While the above discussion indicates that the market incorporates risk differences into debt
prices, a few related studies evaluate whether banks respond in an attempt to decrease the adverse
(costly) impact of the higher yields.  That is, do banks logically respond to market discipline in the
expected manner, or do they essentially ignore the discipline and continue operating as usual.  Is
bank behavior affected by pricing of risk in credit markets?  
Billett, et al. (1998) evaluated the change in bank liability composition following a rating
downgrade.  Analyzing 109 downgrades by Moody's during the 1990-95 period they found that in
the quarter of downgrades, bank's insured deposits significantly increased in both a relative and
absolute sense. In contrast, the interest-sensitive uninsured liabilities (uninsured deposits and
commercial paper) decreased significantly (by 6.6% and 28.0% respectively) over this same16
period.  The authors found the shift toward insured deposits to continue into the following quarter.
Similarly, evaluating the response to ratings upgrades they found that banks responded by
significantly increasing their reliance on uninsured liabilities for two quarter following the ratings
change.  Both sets of findings are consistent with banks responding in the expected manner to
market discipline. 
Marino and Bennett (1999) found similar results when analyzing the shift in liabilities at
large failing banks prior to their demise.  Viewing portfolio trends for several years before failure
they found that the liability structure of a troubled bank changed significantly in the period prior to
failure, with uninsured and unsecured liabilities declining rapidly just before failure. “At failure,
the amount of uninsured deposits and unsecured liabilities is much less than it was in the months or
years before failure.”  They argue that the introduction of depositor preference legislation may
lead to even stronger responses by liability holders in future bank failures as uninsured (and other
lower priority depositors) seek means to protect themselves. 
Instead of evaluating the relationship between risk and sub-debt yield spreads, Covitz, et
al. (2000) evaluated the decision of banking organizations to issue sub-debt. That is, was the
riskiness of the institution associated with the decision to approach the market?  The failure of
riskier institutions to issue, other things constant, would be consistent with a rational response to
market discipline; to avoid the associated high costs. Findings on the issuance decision also have
implications for the yield spread analysis reviewed above.  If the issuance decision is negatively
associated with bank risk then spread analysis may actually understate the actual extent of market
discipline.  
Evaluating the issuance decision for the 50 largest banking organizations for each quarter
over the 1987-1997 period, the findings of Covitz et al.were somewhat similar to those of
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) in that there was little evidence of bank risk measures being
associated with the probability of debt issuance in the earlier period. However, they had a
significant negative effect on the decision during the 1988-92 period. Again, the changing
relationship is typically associated with the regulator’s decision to remove implicit coverage of
all liabilities.  These results are consistent with the firm avoiding new debt issues to circumvent
the additional associated costs, and with the contention that the debt pricing literature may actually17
understate the full extent of market discipline by excluding banks which avoided issuing debt.  The
findings are not as strong after 1992, and the authors attribute this to the rather sanguine time
period for banks and the resulting narrow spreads for all banks.
While most of the research reviewed here deals with banks in the U.S., Martinez Peria and
Schmukler (1998) evaluate market discipline in banking in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during
the 1980s and 1990s. Using an unbalanced panel of banks in these countries, they test whether
changes in bank fundamentals result in changes in deposits. They find evidence of market
discipline. Accounting for macroeconomic influences, banking system factors, and bank-specific
characteristics, they find that bank fundamentals are at least as important as other factors affecting
changes in deposits.
24  Both insured and uninsured deposits respond to changes in bank
fundamentals (risk measures), as do both large and small deposits. They attribute the market
discipline imposed on insured deposits to a possible lack of credibility in the insurance scheme
and the potential for delays in repayments. They conclude that their results are prima facie
evidence in favor of recent regulatory efforts to increase the reliance on market discipline to
control bank risk taking. 
Finally, Bliss and Flannery (2000) stress that while previous studies found evidence of the
ability of the market to evaluate the riskiness of banks (that is, to monitor firm behavior) they
questioned whether the debt markets were able to influence the behavior of bank managers. Does
management respond with portfolio shifts in an attempt to decrease the risk of the bank after debt
holders inform them that they have become concerned with their risk profile (via larger debt
spreads)?  Evaluating large U.S. bank holding companies over the 1986-97 period the authors find
no evidence that bank managers respond to changes in debt spreads by adjusting variables that they
control in an attempt to realign the risk profile of the bank in a manner consistent with the wishes
of debt holders.  They conclude that there is no evidence of influence by debt holders and argue
that regulators would be unwise to pursue a sub-debt program.  Instead, efforts to influence the
behavior of management must be retained by bank supervisors.  
The Bliss and Flannery findings are significant outlyers in the literature. Unlike the findings of
Billett, et al., Covitz, et al., Marino and Montgomery, and Martinez Peria and Schmukler, they do
not find bank management responding to market signals in a way that elicits a positive response18
from the securities market. They conclude: “we find no prima facie support for the hypothesis that
bond holders or stock holders consistently influence day-to-day managerial actions in a prominent
manner consistent with their own interests.”
Actually, they do not test this hypothesis.  They attempt to capture one aspect of discipline
imposed by the debt markets—ex post discipline. Do managers change their behavior following a
change in yield spreads?  However, this ignores the discipline most typically associated with sub-
debt proposals—that is, the steady pressure or disciple that encourages management to behave in a
conservative manner to avoid having the market impose direct costs through increased yield
spreads.  It is this ex ante disciple that encourages the firm to prudently manage risk, and is what
most people think of when considering market discipline.
25 Their conclusions are analogous to
saying that speed limit laws (or laws against robbing banks) are not effective in influencing
behavior because speeders (bank robbers) are often repeat offenders.  However, the argument
entirely ignores the influence these laws have on the behavior of the vast majority of people. 
Similarly, viewing ex post responses to changing sub-debt yields totally ignores the influence on
managers seeking to avoid “punishment” by the market.
Moreover, there are potential biases in the Bliss-Flannery methodology against finding
evidence of debt holder influence.  Security prices may change as a result of a bank announcing a
new policy or as a result of new information reaching the market about existing policies.  Consider
first the case of a bank announcing a new policy.  In the course of setting the policy, management
should anticipate the impact on the wealth of the firm’s shareholders.
26   If management anticipates
that the action will reduce shareholder wealth then it should not undertake the policy.  This is the
ex ante discipline discussed above that will be unobservable because the managers do not
announce and implement the policy change.  Although corporate finance theory suggests that
managers should not undertake actions that reduce shareholder wealth, the evidence suggests that
they sometimes do.  For example, a managerial action that often appears to reduce shareholder
value is the acquisition of another firm.
27 However, in this case a manager with rational
expectations would expect that announcing the new policy or action would be accompanied by a
reduction in the per share value of the firm’s common stock.
28  Given that the manager rationally
anticipated the reduction in shareholder wealth, and nevertheless proceeded with the action, there19
is no reason to expect the firm to undertake some further action in response to the drop in share
price (or increase in debt spreads).  Thus, in those cases where market discipline is ineffective ex
ante, we would ordinarily not expect to observe such discipline ex post
Now consider the case of adverse new information arriving about past policies.  Assume
first that the signal to the market is fully revealing; that is, the market knows the exact extent of the
loss to the bank.  In this case, the bank managers must compare the costs and benefits of alternative
means of responding to the new information.  If the loss is small and the cost of all the responses is
high then senior bank management may rationally do nothing.  Alternatively, senior management
may respond, but in ways that do not appear in the banks’ financial statement, such as by firing the
individuals responsible for the losses.  Finally, Bliss and Flannery also evaluated whether the
securities markets responded favorably to any response that does come from management. 
However, if management responds in an observable manner, we will not observe a subsequent
positive market response unless market participants were sufficiently uncertain that management
would take the appropriate action.  If such action is assigned a high probability at the time the bad
news is revealed then most of the positive effect of the subsequent action will be priced into the
stock at the time the bad news is announced. Thus, unless we confine our observations to large
stock price changes, we are unlikely to see them undertake costly responses, and even when the
losses are large the response may take a form not readily observable in financial statements or may
not be a surprise to the financial markets.
Next consider the case of adverse new information arriving about past policies, where the
signal is only partially revealing to the market.  In this case, management’s response to the news
may provide additional information to the market.  If management does nothing then the market may
assign a higher probability to the belief that the losses were small relative to their initial
expectations.  This could encourage fewer responses by managers. However, if management takes
drastic action, such as cutting dividends or issuing new stock, then the market may infer that the
losses were larger than they initially anticipated and further reduce the firm’s share price.  In this
case, the Bliss and Flannery test would find that the market was effective in inducing managers to
act but that the effect of their action was perverse which in their model raises doubts about market
discipline.20
Thus, the Bliss and Flannery methodology and tests are likely to reveal beneficial market
discipline only if:  (1) new information arises about past policies, (2) the signal to the market
reveals almost all of the information, (3) market participants assign a significant probability that
the manager will not take the appropriate action, (4) the gain from taking action exceeds the cost of
the action, and (5) the optimal set of actions includes actions observable on the balance sheet. 
Such situations undoubtedly occur.  However, Bliss and Flannery incorporate all stock price
moves and, hence, their sample almost surely includes a large number of shocks to stock prices
where we would not expect to identify a managerial response using their empirical technique. 
Thus, one should not be surprised if noise from all other possible situations where the firm’s stock
price declines obscures the market signal that the authors are looking for.
Nevertheless, based on their findings, Bliss and Flannery claim a rather strong policy
position. They argue that “supervisors would be unwise to rely on investors—including
subordinated debenture holders—to constrain BHC risk-taking….(S)upervisors must retain the
responsibility for influencing managerial actions.”  The conclusions seem rather strong given the
rather limited scope of their analysis and the associated biases against finding evidence of
“influence.”
In summary, the literature on the behavioral response of banks to market and supervisory
discipline suggests that they respond in the expected manner: to decrease the costs of the
discipline. Bliss and Flannery seem to be the only exception to this finding. The literature,
however, is rather limited and there is a need for additional research.
A related topic concerns whether the information used by private markets to price bank
risk is similar to that available to bank supervisors; either in content or the timing of its
availability.  It has been argued that via the on-sight examination process, bank supervisors have
access to insider information, which the market generally does not have.  Alternatively, the
private market has the stronger incentive to obtain the necessary information to make informed
investment decisions. Additionally, it may be that the information sought by the various “bank-
watchers” differs since they each serve different roles.  Equity-holders, for example, may be
concerned with the potential for banks to generate efficiency gains instead of concentrating on the
bank’s probability of failure.  In contrast, the objectives of sub-debt-holders and bank supervisors21
probably align quite well in that both are most interested in protecting against failure. Thus, it
would be informative to contrast the availability of information available to the two potential
disciplinarians. 
Most of the recent research in this area suggests that supervisors may temporarily have
inside information not immediately observable on bank financial statement and, hence, possibly not
known by the market.  Dahl, Hanweck and O’Keefe (1995) found that significant contributions to
loan loss reserves typically occurred immediately following a bank examination, suggesting new
information was uncovered during the exam and/or pressure exerted to have the bank report more
accurately.  Cole and Gunther (1998) attempted to predict bank failure with models using publicly
available financial data, and then augmented their model with CAMEL ratings to test if the
additional information improved the predictive power of the model.  They found that the
augmented model did more accurately predict bank failure, but only if the CAMEL rating was less
than six months old.  After that, the data appeared to be “stale” and to have already been
incorporated into the market’s information set.  This staleness finding is rather typical in the
literature suggesting that over time the additional information permeates to the broader market. 
Berger and Davies (1994), for example, found that CAMEL upgrades were quickly integrated into
market prices (suggesting that the bank's may have been releasing the new examination information
to the market) but downgrades were only incorporated with a lag (suggesting the bank was able to
temporarily keep adverse information from the market, but not from examiners). 
More directly related to sub-debt proposals, the study by DeYoung, Flannery, Lang, and
Sorescu (1998) considered the information content of bank examinations as it relates to secondary
market sub-debt spreads.  The study compared CAMEL ratings against various market assessments
of bank condition and found that bank examination ratings contained private information about a
bank’s safety and soundness not available to the market.  They tested whether the market
incorporated new private supervisory information into the risk premium paid on holding company
debentures, with a lag.  They concluded that bank exams provided significant new information that
was not internalized by financial markets for several months.   The study did not consider the
opposite effect: whether there was information in the private market beyond that which the
examiners already had access to.22
This last issue, however, was examined by Berger, Davies and Flannery (1999) when they
analyzed the information sets of examiners
29 and the private market to see "who knows what,
when?"  They test to see whether private market assessments of the condition of bank holding
companies change before or after supervisors change their assessments. Similarly, they evaluate
whether information in private markets precedes changes in the assessments of supervisors?
30 
Their general conclusion was that supervisory assessments and private market assessments
complement each other in that pertinent information obtained by each group is only subsequently
incorporated into the other group’s assessments.  Thus, each group appears to bring new and
valuable information to the table, and that information is incorporated with a lag into the other
group’s information set.
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The bottom line appears to be that different market participants (supervisors, bond market
participants, rating agencies, etc.) generate valuable complementary information which can be
useful in the governance of banks, albeit more work in this area is warranted. 
Therefore the evidence as a whole appears to be consistent with the presumption that sub-
debt-holders effectively discipline banks in the expected manner. The effectiveness of a sub-debt
requirement, however, would depend critically on the structure of the program. Below we briefly
review previous sub-debt proposals and present a new one that we believe to have the most
desirable characteristics.
IV. SUMMARY OF PAST PROPOSALS 
Since the mid-1980s there have been a number of regulatory reform proposals aimed at
capturing the benefits of sub-debt.
32  A detailed survey of past proposals is provided in Kwast et
al. (1999) and is summarized in Table 1.  Below we provide a partial review of these proposals
stressing only those that emphasize the characteristics on which the proposal we develop in the
next section is based. The typical benefits emphasized in the previous proposals result from the
ability of sub-debt to provide a capital cushion, to impose both direct- and derived-discipline on
banks, and from the tax benefits associated with debt.
33  Summarily, this results in the following
benefits:
-a bank riskiness or asset quality signal for regulators and market participants, 23
-the potential for a more prompt failure resolution process resulting in fewer losses to
the insurance fund,
-a more methodical failure resolution process resulting from the rather methodical
pressure imposed by debt-holders as they, unlike depositors, are forced to wait until
the debt matures to “walk” away from the bank rather than run, and
-lower cost of capital because of the tax advantages of deducting interest payments on
debt as an expense, enabling bank’s cost of capital to decrease and/or supervisors to
increase capital requirements. 
Horvitz (1983, 1984, 1987) discussed each of these advantages in his initial sub-debt
proposal and extended that discussion in Benston, et al. (1986).  He challenged the view that
equity capital is necessarily preferred to debt.  While equity is permanent and losses can indeed be
charged against it, he questioned why one would want to keep a troubled bank in operation long
enough to make this feature relevant.  Similarly, while interest on debt does represent a fixed
charge against bank earnings, whereas dividends on equity do not, a bank with problems
significant enough to prevent these interest payments has most likely already incurred deposit
withdrawals and has reached, or is approaching, insolvency.  Arguing that higher capital levels
were needed at the bank level, and were simply not feasible through equity alone, Horvitz stated
that sub-debt requirements of “say, 4% of assets” were a means to increase total capital
requirements to nine or 10 percent.  Without providing specifics, it was argued that debt-holders
would logically require debt covenants that would give them the right to close or take over the
bank once net worth was exhausted.  Thus, sub-debt was seen as an ideal cushion for the FDIC. 
In a comprehensive bank regulatory reform proposal, Keehn (1989) incorporated sub-debt
as a centerpiece of the “FRB-Chicago Proposal” for deregulation.
34    The plan called for a
modification of the eight percent capital requirement to require a minimum of four percent of risk-
weighted assets be held as sub-debt.  The bonds would have maturities of no less than five years,
with the issues staggered to insure that between 10 and 20 percent of the debt would mature and be
rolled over each year.  The inability to do so would serve as a clear signal that the bank was in
financial trouble triggering regulatory restrictions and debt covenants.
35 Debt covenants would
enable the debt-holders to initiate closure procedures and would convert debt-holders to an equity24
position once equity was exhausted.  They would have a limited time to recapitalize the bank, find
a suitable acquirer, or liquidate the bank.  It was argued that debt-holders could be expected to
effectively discipline bank behavior, and provide for an orderly resolution process when failure
did occur. The discipline imposed by sub-debt-holders could differ significantly from that
imposed by depositors as outstanding sub-debt could not run from the bank. The potential for
regulatory forbearance was also thought to be less as holders of sub-debt would be less concerned
with giving the troubled bank additional time to correct its problems and would pressure
regulators to act promptly when banks in which they were invested
encountered difficulties.  
To address concerns about the mispriced bank safety net and potential losses to the
insurance fund, Wall (1989) introduced a sub-debt plan aimed at creating a banking environment
that would function similar to one without deposit insurance; but the insurance would be
maintained.  The plan was to have banks issue and maintain ‘puttable’ sub-debt equal to four or
five percent of risk-weighted assets.  If the debt was put on the bank by debt-holders, the bank
would have 90 days to make the necessary adjustments to insure the minimum regulatory
requirements were satisfied.  That is, it could either retire the debt and continue to meet the
regulatory requirement because of excess debt holdings, issue new puttable debt, or shrink assets
to satisfy the requirement.  If after 90 days the bank could not satisfy the requirement, it would be
resolved.  The put option has advantages in that it would force the bank to continually satisfy the
market of its soundness and not just when new debt issues come due.  Additionally, while earlier
plans discussed the need for bond covenants to protect debt-holders, all contingencies would be
covered under this plan as the market could demand redemption of the bonds without cause.  This
would essentially eliminate the practice of regulatory forbearance, a significant concern during the
late 1980s, and would subject the bank to increased market discipline. Wall also stressed the need
for restrictions on debt-holders to limit insider holdings.  
Calomiris (1997, 1998, 1999) augmented previous sub-debt proposals by imposing a
minimum sub-debt requirement (say two percent of total assets) and imposing a yield ceiling (say
50 basis points above the riskless rate). The spread ceiling is seen as a simple means of
implementing regulatory discipline for banks.  If banks cannot roll over maturing debt at the25
mandated spread, they would be required to shrink their risk-weighted assets to maintain
regulatory compliance.  Debt would have two-year maturities with issues being staggered to have
equal portions come due each month.  This would limit the maximum required monthly asset
reduction to approximately four percent of assets.  To insure adequate discipline, Calomiris also
incorporated restrictions on who would be eligible to hold the debt.
36  
The effectiveness of any sub-debt requirement depends critically on the structure and
characteristics of the program. Most importantly, the characteristics should be consistent with the
regulatory objectives such as increasing direct discipline to alter risk behavior, to increase
derived discipline, or to limit or eliminate regulatory forbearance. The proposals discussed above
each have some of these objectives in mind in determining their characteristics.  Keehn, for
example, was particularly interested in derived discipline.  Wall’s proposal is most effective at
addressing regulatory forbearance. Calomiris’ spread ceiling most directly uses derived discipline
to force the bank into mandated behavioral changes when the spread begins to bind.
We believe that subordinated debt’s greatest value in the near term is as a risk signal.
However, the earliest proposals had limited discussion of the use of sub-debt for derived
regulatory discipline. The next round of plans, such as those by Keehn and Wall, use derived
discipline but the only signal that they obtain from the sub-debt market is the bank’s ability to issue
debt.  We have considerable sympathy for this approach.  These types of plans maximize the scope
for the free market to allocate resources by imposing minimal restrictions while eliminating
forbearance and protecting the deposit insurance fund.  However, the cost of providing bank
managers with this much freedom is to delay regulatory intervention until a bank is deemed by the
markets to be “too risky to save.”  As Benston and Kaufman (1988a, 1988b) argue, proposals to
delay regulatory intervention until closure may be time inconsistent in that such abrupt action may
be perceived by regulators as suboptimal when the tripwire is finally triggered.  Moreover, market
discipline will be eroded to the extent that market participants do not believe the plan will be
enforced.  Benston and Kaufman argue that a plan of gradually stricter regulatory intervention as a
bank’s financial condition worsens may be more credible.  A version of that proposal, commonly
labeled “structured early intervention” or “prompt corrective action,” was adopted as a part of the
FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.26
In theory, by imposing limits on sub-debt rates Calomiris provides a mechanism for this
progressive discipline that could last for approximately two years.  In practice, however, his plan
would likely provide the same sort of abrupt discipline as would the prior proposals, with the
primary difference being that Calomiris would likely trigger the discipline while the bank was in a
stronger condition.  By requiring banks to shrink if they cannot issue sub-debt at a sufficiently
small premium, his plan would provide banks with a period of time during which they could
respond by issuing new equity.  If the bank could not issue equity then it would have to shrink and
would most likely accomplish this by calling in maturing loans to good borrowers and selling its
most liquid assets to minimize losses.  However, the most liquid assets are also likely to be among
the lowest risk assets implying that with each monthly decline in size, the bank would be left with
a less liquid and more risky portfolio.  This decrease in liquidity and increase in risk is likely to
reduce most banks’ viability significantly within, at most, a few months.  Yet, the prior proposals
that would rely on bank’s ability to issue sub-debt at any price also gave managers some time to
issue new equity either by automatically imposing a stay (Wall’s proposal) or by requiring
relatively infrequent rollovers (Keehn’s proposal).  Thus, Calomiris’ proposal is subject to the
same sorts of concerns that arise with the earlier proposals.
Although Calomiris’ proposal for relying on progressive discipline is more abrupt than it
appears at first glance, his suggestion that regulators use the rates on sub-debt to trigger
supervisory action provides a mechanism for phasing in stricter discipline.  In the next section we
provide a combination of Calomiris’ idea of using market rates with Benston and Kaufman’s
proposal for progressively increasing discipline.
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V.   A COMPREHENSIVE SUBORDINATED DEBT PROPOSAL   
As discussed earlier, banking organizations’ entry into new activities is raising additional
questions about how to best regulate the risk behavior of financial firms.  Ideally the new activities
could avoid either greatly extending the safety net beyond its current reach or imposing costly
supervision procedures to new activities.  A plan incorporating sub-debt could help in meeting
these challenges. Markets already provide most of the discipline on non-depository financial
institutions, as well as virtually all non-financial firms.  A carefully crafted plan may be able to27
tap similar market discipline to help limit the safety net without extending costly supervision.
Below we present and describe a detailed sub-debt proposal.
38 While the U.S. banking
sector is the target, there are broader implications as international capital standards come into
play. While others have argued that U.S. banking agencies could go forward without international
cooperation, we think there are benefits from working with the international banking agencies, if
possible.   The explicit goals of our proposal are to (1) limit the safety net exposure to loss, (2)
establish risk measures that accurately assess the risks undertaken by banks, especially those that
are part of large, complex financial organizations, and (3) provide supervisors with the ability to
manage (but not prevent) the exit of failing organizations.  The use of sub-debt can help achieve
these goals by imposing some direct discipline on banks, providing more accurate risk measures,
and providing the appropriate signals for derived discipline and, ultimately, failure resolution.
Setting the Ground Rules
As a starting point, a decision has to be made as to whether a new sub-debt program should
be “fitted” within the existing regulatory framework, or whether adjustments to the framework are
necessary to have the debt effectively fulfill its stated role.  Obviously there are tradeoffs. In our
view, however, the goals of the proposal cannot be effectively achieved in the current regulatory
environment which allows banks to hold sub-debt, but does not require it. As a result, banks are
most likely to opt-out of rolling over maturing debt or introducing new issues precisely in those
situations when sub-debt would restrict their behavior and signal regulators that the bank is
financially weak. Indeed, Covitz, et al. (2000) found evidence of such behavior.   Only a
mandatory requirement would achieve the expected benefits.  Thus, our proposal requires banks to
hold minimum levels of sub-debt.
Similarly, other restrictions in the current regulatory environment limit the potential
effectiveness of a sub-debt program.  In our view, when developing a sub-debt policy, the form of
the proposal should follow function.  However, the role that sub-debt serves is significantly driven
by its role in bank capital guidelines.  In the current regulatory environment, that role is determined
by the Basel Accord that counts sub-debt as an element of Tier 2 capital, with the associated
restrictions, and limits the amount that may be counted as regulatory capital.
Maintaining the current restrictions has two bothersome implications.  First, it dictates28
almost all of the terms of the sub-debt proposal. For example, U.S. banks operating under current
Basel constraints have generally chosen to issue 10-year sub-debt. If there are perceived benefits
from having a homogeneous debt instrument, in the current regulatory environment the optimal
maturity would appear to be ten years. This is not to say that if left unconstrained financial firms
would prefer 10-year maturities.  Indeed bankers frequently criticize the restrictions imposed on
sub-debt issues that, as discussed above, make it a less attractive form of capital. Ideally, without
the restrictions imposed by Basel, the maturity would be much shorter to allow it to better match
the duration of the bank balance sheet.  However once the 10-year maturity is decided upon as a
result of the restrictions, to avoid "chopping" the debt requirement too finely the frequency of
issuance is operationally limited.  For example, with a two percent sub-debt requirement,
mandating issuance twice a year would require a $50 billion bank to regularly come to the market
with $50 million issues—significantly smaller than the standard issue in today's markets. Thus
adhering to the current Basel restrictions would determine one of the interdependent parameters,
and thus drives them all.  Adjusting the Basel restrictions would "free up" the parameters of any
new sub-debt proposal.
The second implication of following the current Basel Accord is that sub-debt is not
effectively designed to enhance market discipline.  Given that sub-debt was considered an equity
substitute in the capital structure, it was designed to function much like equity and to provide
supervisory flexibility in dealing with distressed institutions. In particular, the value of the sub-
debt is amortized over a five-year period to encourage banks to use longer-term debt.  Further, the
interest rate on the debt does not float; thus it is limited in its ability to impose direct discipline
when there are changes in the banks risk exposure.  Finally, because sub-debt is regarded as an
inferior form of equity, the amount of sub-debt is limited in the Accord to 50 percent of the bank's
Tier 1 capital.
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If indeed there are benefits to giving sub-debt a larger role in the bank capital structure,
then consideration should be given to eliminating the current disadvantages to using it as capital. 
That is the approach taken in our proposal presented below.29
The Proposal
Our sub-debt program would be implemented in stages as conditions permit.
Stage 1: Surveillance stage
For immediate implementation:
-Sub-debt prices and other information should be used in monitoring the financial condition
of the 25 largest banks and bank holding companies in the U.S.
40 Procedures should be
implemented for acquiring the best possible pricing data on a frequent basis for these institutions,
with supplementary data being collected for other issuing banks and bank holding companies. 
Supervisory staff could gain experience in evaluating how bank soundness relates to debt prices,
spreads, etc., and how changes in these elements correlate with firm soundness.  
-Simultaneously, in line with the mandate of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, staffs of
regulatory agencies should study the value of information derived from debt prices and quantities
in determining bank soundness, and evaluate the usefulness of sub-debt in increasing market
discipline in banking.  Efforts should be made to obtain information on the depth and liquidity of
debt issues, including the issues of smaller firms. 
-If deemed necessary, the regulatory agencies should obtain the necessary authority (via
congressional action or regulatory mandate) to allow the federal banking agencies to require banks
and bank holding companies to issue a minimum amount of sub-debt with prescribed
characteristics, and to use the debt levels and prices in implementing prompt corrective action as
described in FDICIA.  The legislation would explicitly prohibit the FDIC from absorbing losses
for sub-debt-holders, thus excluding sub-debt from the systemic risk exception in FDICIA.
-The bank regulatory agencies should work to alter the Basel Accord to eliminate the
unfavorable characteristics of sub-debt: the 50 percent of Tier 1 limitation and the required
amortization. 
Stage 2: Introductory Stage
To be implemented when authority to mandate sub-debt is obtained:
-The 25 largest banks would be required to issue a minimum of two percent of risk-
weighted assets in sub-debt on an annual basis with qualifying issues at least 3 months apart to30
avoid long periods between issues or “bunching” of issues during particularly tranquil times.
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-The sub-debt must be issued to independent third parties and be tradable in the secondary
market. The sub-debt's lead underwriter and market makers may not be institutions affiliated with
the issuing bank, nor may the debt be held by affiliates. Additionally, no form of credit
enhancement could support the debt.
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-The terms of the debt should explicitly state and emphasize its junior status, and the
understanding that the holder would not have access to a “rescue” under the too-big-to-fail
systemic risk clause. It is imperative that the debt-holders behave as unsecured, junior creditors. 
-Failure to comply with the issuance requirement would trigger a presumption that the bank
was critically undercapitalized.  If the bank’s outstanding sub-debt traded at yields comparable to
those of firms with a below investment grade rating (Ba or lower---that is, junk bonds) for a
period of two weeks or longer then the bank would be presumed to be severely undercapitalized.
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-Regulators would investigate whether the remaining capital triggers or tripwires
associated with prompt corrective action could be augmented with sub-debt rate-based triggers.
The analysis would consider both the form of the trigger mechanism (e.g., rate spreads over risk-
free bonds, or relative to certain rating classes, etc.) and the exact rates/spreads which should
serve as triggers. 
-The sub-debt requirement would be phased in over a transition period.
Stage 3: The Mature Stage
To be implemented when adjustments to the Basel Accord allow for sufficient flexibility in setting
the program parameters, or at such time as it becomes clear that adequate modifications in the
international capital agreement are not possible:
-A minimum sub-debt requirement of at least three percent of risk-weighted-assets would
apply to the largest 25 banks, with the expressed intent to extend the requirement to additional
banks unless regulator's analysis of sub-debt markets finds evidence that the costs of issuance by
additional banks would be prohibitive. The increased flexibility is expected to allow for an
increase in the number of banks which can cost effectively be included in the program.
-The sub-debt must be 5-year, non-callable, fixed rate debt.
-There must be a minimum of two issues a year and the two qualifying issues must be at31
least two months apart.
Discussion of the Proposal
Stage 1:
Stage 1 is essentially a surveillance and preparatory stage.   It is necessary because more
information about bank debt markets is needed, and the rest of our proposal requires that the
regulators have the ability to require sub-debt issuance and access to data to implement the
remaining aspects of the plan.  This step is already being implemented in part. Information on bank
debt markets is currently being developed.  Staff at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System are collecting and analyzing sub-debt price data, and research is underway at the Reserve
Banks evaluating the relationship between bank risk and debt spreads. 
Stage 2:
Stage 2 is designed to introduce a sub-debt program and begin using sub-debt as a
supplement to the current capital tripwires under prompt corrective action.  The ultimate goal of
Stage 2 is to use sub-debt-based risk measures to augment capital-based measures, assuming a
satisfactory resolution of some practical problems discussed below.  The requirement that the debt
be sold to independent third parties, be tradable, that the market makers be unaffiliated with the
bank, and that affiliates cannot hold the debt are all intended to prevent the bank or its affiliates
from “jamming” the signal by buying the debt at above market prices. 
The sub-debt tripwires initially set out in Stage 2 may reasonably be considered “loose.”
Banks that cannot issue sub-debt are probably at or near the brink of insolvency, especially given
that they only need to find one issuance window during the course of a year.  If a bank’s sub-debt
is trading at yields comparable to junk bonds then the bank is most likely having significant
difficulties and supervisors should be actively involved. We would not ordinarily expect the
supervisors to need assistance in identifying banks experiencing this degree of financial distress. 
However, the presence of such tripwires would reinforce the current mandate of prompt corrective
action.  Further, it would strengthen derived discipline by other market participants by setting
lower bounds on acceptable sub-debt rates.32
The use of sub-debt yields for all of the tripwires under prompt corrective action could
offer significant advantages.  As discussed earlier, market based tripwires are expected to be more
closely associated with bank risk. It should be emphasized, however, that the sub-debt signal is
intended to augment and not replace supervisory oversight.  In theory, it is clear how combining
market signals with supervisory decisions can lead to improved bank regulation.  For example, the
financial condition of banks may be such that some obviously need intensive oversight, and others
obviously do not. However, there may be a third group where the need is less obvious.  
Combining market with supervisory information may increase the potential for correctly
identifying the problem institutions in the third group.  Additionally, if supervisors would, absent
use of a market-based signal, exercise forbearance for banks that they know need intensive
oversight, then supervisory effectiveness may be enhanced by also incorporating the market signal.
Two dimensions will need further work, however, before heavy reliance on sub-debt
spreads for supervisory intervention is possible.  First, regulators need to review the history of
sub-debt rates to determine how best to extract the risk signals from sub-debt yields, and how best
to deal with periods of illiquidity in the bond market.
44   Concerning the risk signal, should sub-
debt spreads be measured relative to Treasury obligations? The yields on Aaa bonds? The yields
on the lowest investment grade category (Baa) or some other instrument?  Is it feasible to map sub-
debt yields to implied ratings by comparing the yields on sub-debt with comparable maturity
corporate bonds of similar maturity?  What are the properties of sub-debt yields through time?  In
particular, are there times when the yields become unreliable, as claimed by some market
participants in discussions with Kwast et al. (1999)?  If so, how long are these periods and how
can they best be identified?
A second dimension that needs further analysis deals with determining “acceptable” bank
failure rates. The linking of sub-debt rates to prompt corrective action will imply a tighter link
between the prompt corrective action categories and the risk of failure than is possible under the
current Basel Accord risk measures.  As emphasized by Mingo (1999), an increase in precision
will force senior policymakers to be careful in deciding where to set the tripwires. This decision
is less important under the current risk based capital framework because the risk measures used by
the capital adequacy standards are so inaccurate that there is little point in trying to estimate the33
expected failure rate associated with any given capital adequacy standard.  With credit spreads,
decisions will need to be made concerning what risk of failure is acceptable for a bank to be
identified as “well capitalized,” “adequately capitalized,” or “undercapitalized”?   If regulators
require failure rates that are too low then some intermediation activity will be inefficiently pushed
out of the banking system.  If acceptable failure rates are set too high then both the FDIC’s
insurance fund and the financial system may be subject to excessive risk. Thus far, neither
supervisors nor the academic literature has seriously addressed this problem. However, Mingo’s
question cannot be avoided if supervisors start using more accurate risk measures.  We address
these issues by initially setting rather loose prompt corrective action triggers, and in so doing keep
supervisory judgement as the primary risk measure and using sub-debt spreads as a failsafe
mechanism. Thus, at this stage we recommend rather loose triggers and further study by regulators,
academics and bankers to determine the proper course to take before proceeding to the next stage
of the plan.
Stage 3:
This is the mature stage. The increased amount of required sub-debt and the shorter
maturity in Stage 3 should enhance the opportunity for sub-debt to exercise direct discipline on
banks. Another advantage of this proposal is that banks would be somewhat compensated, via the
increased attractiveness of sub-debt as regulatory capital, for any increased regulatory burden
from holding the additional debt.  The removal of these restrictions could be quite significant, as it
would serve as a ‘carrot’ that will make the cost of holding the debt less burdensome than under
current regulatory arrangements. While it is not obvious whether total regulatory burden will
increase as a result of the proposal, it seems more likely that as a result of this carrot the net
burden would be less.  The 5-year maturities in this stage allow for more frequent issuance, which
should increase direct market discipline and market information.  At the same time, five years is
thought to be sufficient to tie the debt to the bank and limit bank runs.
The principal difference in this stage is the recommendation to shorten the maturity of the
sub-debt.  The advantages of requiring a shorter maturity are that it will allow more frequent
issuance and result in a larger fraction of the sub-debt being repriced every year.  Banks should
find this advantageous.  A minor downside is that it may require regulators to recalibrate the sub-34
debt yield trigger points for prompt corrective action for the categories of well capitalized,
adequately capitalized and undercapitalized.  However, as indicated above, this recalibration will
most likely be an ongoing process as additional market expertise is obtained.
One aspect of our proposal that may appear to be controversial is the movement toward
eliminating restrictions on sub-debt imposed by the Basel Accord.  However, once the decision is
made to employ sub-debt for overseeing bank activities, the restrictions appear unnecessary and
overly burdensome.  They only serve to increase the cost to participating banks and to limit the
flexibility of the program.  Without the current restrictions banks would prefer to issue shorter-
term debt and, in some situations, would be able to count more sub-debt as regulatory capital. 
Similarly, as discussed earlier, the parameters of any sub-debt policy will be driven in great part
by current regulatory restrictions.  Keeping those restrictions in place would therefore place an
unnecessary burden on participating banks, and would limit regulators, without any obvious
positive payoff.  This is not to say that initiating changes to the Accord would be costless. 
Obviously negotiations would be required since other country members may want to continue to
have sub-debt be an inferior form of capital.  But from the participating U.S. banks’ perspective,
and the regulators’ perspective concerning program flexibility, the elimination of these restrictions
should result in net benefits. The effort to adjust Basel also does not slow the movement toward
implementation of a sub-debt program since the program would be phased in through the three-
stage process.  However, laying out the broad parameters of the complete plan in advance would
indicate a commitment by regulators and could increase the credibility of the program.
45 Once fully
implemented, sub-debt would become an integral part of the bank regulatory structure. 
VI. COMMON CONCERNS AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SUB-DEBT
PROPOSALS
There are a number of common issues raised about the viability of sub-debt proposals.  For
completeness, below we address some of these issues and clarify exactly what sub-debt programs
can be expected to accomplish. We also highlight where our proposed sub-debt program
specifically addresses these issues.  Indeed these issues were important in the development of that
program and we believe the concerns to be significantly less important under our proposal.35
q  Won’t the regulatory agencies ‘bail out’ troubled institutions by making sub-debt holders at
failed institutions whole if they would have suffered losses otherwise, thus eliminating the
purported benefits of a sub-debt program?
This is probably the most fundamental concern raised about the viability of sub-debt
proposals.  An implicit guarantee may at times be more distorting to market behavior than is an
explicit guarantee.  If debt-holders believe an implicit guarantee exists, that is, regulators will
make them whole if the issuing bank encounters difficulties and cannot make payment on their debt,
then they will behave accordingly.  Acting as if they are not subject to losses, they will fail to
impose the necessary discipline on which the benefits of sub-debt proposals rely.  There was
evidence of such indifference to bank risk levels in the 1980s when the handling of the Continental
Illinois National Bank situation ingrained the too-big-to-fail doctrine into bank investor's decision
making.  In essence, if the market discipline is not allowed to work, it will not.  This applies to
sub-debt.
However, a bailout is unlikely under current arrangements and our proposal makes it even
less likely. Sub-debt-holders are sophisticated investors. They understand their position of junior
priority, and the resulting potential losses should the issuing firm encounter difficulties. There can
be little merit in, nor sympathy to, arguments that the debt-holder was unsophisticated and unaware
of their claimant status.  Additionally, since banks are not subject to bankruptcy laws, the debt-
holders could not argue for a preferred position by refusing to accept the bankruptcy reorganization
plan.  Thus they are unable to block the resolution. So pressures to rescue debt-holders should not
result from their status as unsophisticated investors, nor their bargaining power in the failure
resolution process. 
The FDIC guaranteed the sub-debt of Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984, but it did
so to avoid having to close the bank and not to protect the sub-debt-holders per se.  The effect of
FDICIA and its prompt corrective action, least cost resolution requirements, and too-big-to-fail
policies, was to significantly curtail and limit the instances when uninsured liability holders would
be protected from loses.  Benston and Kaufman (1998) found that policy did change as a result of
FDICIA, as significantly fewer uninsured depositors were protected from losses at both large and36
small banks after passage of the legislation. Similarly, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) found
evidence that the markets viewed FDICIA as a credible change in policy and, as a result, sub-debt
prices began reflecting differences in bank risk exposures.  Thus, the market apparently already
believes that sub-debt-holders are unlikely to be bailed out in the future.
Under our sub-debt proposal there would be still less potential for debt-holder rescues. 
Unlike deposits that are callable on demand, the intermediate term debt could only leave as it
matured instead of initiating a bank run which has typically prompted the rescues we have seen in
the past.  Additionally sub-debt yield spreads are likely to provide more accurate risk measures
for prompt corrective action rather than are book value capital ratios. Finally, under our proposal
the sub-debt-holder would be explicitly excluded from the class of liabilities that could be
covered under the systemic risk exception. This exclusion should be viewed favorably by banks
since under the terms of the too-big-to-fail exception in FDICIA, losses from the rescue would
have to be funded via a special assessment of banks.  Therefore, they should encourage the FDIC
to strictly limit the extent of the liabilities rescued. 
q  Are there cost implications for banks?
 Interestingly, the costs associated with issuing sub-debt have been used as an argument
both for and against sub-debt proposals. The standard argument is that there are relative cost
advantages of issuing debt resulting from the tax treatment associated with it.
46   It is also argued
that closely held banks may find debt to be a less expensive capital source as new equity injections
would come from investors that realize they will have a minor ownership role.
47   Both influences
would suggest increased reliance on sub-debt would be cost saving. 
There are, however, some additional actual or potential costs to increased sub-debt issues.
 First, increased reliance on relatively frequent debt rollovers would generate transaction costs or
issuance costs.  There is disagreement as to just how expensive these costs would be. Some argue
that the cost would be similar to that required for issuing bank CDs while others argue that the cost
could be quite substantial. The issuance frequency discussed in most sub-debt proposals, however,
is not very different from the current frequency of large banking organizations.  Two issues per
year, which is well within the recommendations in most sub-debt proposals, is relatively common37
in today’s banking markets.
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A more significant concern seems to be where, within the overall banking organization, the
debt would be issued.  Most sub-debt proposals require the debt to be issued at the bank level
whereas, until recently, most sub-debt was issued at the bank holding company level.  This
allowed the holding company the flexibility to distribute the proceeds throughout the affiliated
firms in the organization. This occurred in spite of the fact that rating agencies typically rated bank
debt higher than the debt of the holding company and, similarly, holding company debt typically
traded at a premium to comparable bank debt.
49   This would suggest that the additional flexibility
from issuing at the holding company level has value for the banking organization, and elimination
of this flexibility, which most of the proposals would do, would impose costs. The recent trend
toward issuing more debt at the bank level, however, would suggest the value of this flexibility has
become less important than in the past. 
A more important cost implication is imbedded in our sub-debt proposal.  In the past,
regulators have restricted the use of sub-debt by limiting the amount that could count as capital and
by requiring that the value of the sub-debt be amortized over the last five years before maturity. 
These restrictions are imposed because, unlike equity, the firm will still need to make periodic
payments on the debt, regardless of its financial condition. However, this does not decrease the
effectiveness of sub-debt in serving the capital role as a cushion against losses. It still buffers the
insurance fund.   By eliminating these restrictions in our sub-debt proposal we enhance the value
of the debt as capital and decrease the net cost of introducing the proposal. 
q  Isn’t there a problem in that sub-debt proposals are procyclical?
A possible concern with sub-debt requirements is that they may encourage procyclical
behavior by banks, increased lending during economic expansions and exacerbating the decline in
lending during recessions.  However, this is not unique to sub-debt programs; any regulatory
requirement that does not adjust over the course of a business cycle has the potential to be
procyclical if banks seek to only satisfy the minimum requirements.  For example, Appendix D of
Kwast et al. (1999), points out that bank capital adequacy ratios are likely to decline during
recessions as banks experience higher loan losses, implying that regulation based on capital38
adequacy ratios has the potential to be procyclical.
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The procyclicality of a regulatory requirement may be at least partially offset if banks seek
to maintain some cushion above minimum regulatory requirements that they may draw on during
economic downturns.  In the case of the regulatory capital adequacy requirements, both casual
observation of recent bank behavior and formal empirical analysis from the 1980s and early 1990s
suggest that banks do indeed seek to maintain such a cushion for contingencies.
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Moreover, a regulatory program that uses sub-debt yields as triggers for regulatory action
can be designed to induce less procyclical behavior than would other types of regulatory
requirements. Consider two ways to design the sub-debt triggers as discussed in Kwast et al.
(1999).  One design is to base regulatory action on a constant basis point spread over bonds with
little or no credit risk, such as Treasury securities.  Such a standard is more likely to become
binding during recessions when banks are experiencing loan losses and investors demand higher
risk premiums to continue holding bank bonds.  Thus, a policy that sets triggers at a constant
premium over Treasury may result in procyclical regulation in a manner similar to that of standard
capital requirements.
Another way of designing the triggers, however, is to base them on a measure that has
yields which vary countercyclically over the business cycle.  One such measure is the yields on
corporate bonds of a given rating.  There is evidence that bond-rating agencies seek to smooth
ratings through business cycles.  For example, Theodore (1999, p.10) describes Moody’s ratings
policies as follows:
Moody’s bank ratings…aim at looking to the medium- to long-term, through
cyclical trends.  For example, a drop in quarterly, semi-annual or even annual
earnings is not necessarily a reason to downgrade a bank’s ratings. 
However, if the earnings drop is the result of a structural degradation of a
bank’s fundamentals, credit ratings need to reflect the new developing
condition of the bank.
If the rating agencies are trying to “look through the business cycle,” then the spreads on corporate
bonds over default risk-free securities should be small during expansions because investors, but
not the rating agencies, recognize a lower probability of default during expansions.  Similarly, the
spreads on corporate bonds over default risk-free bonds should rise during recessions as the
market, but not the rating agencies, recognize the increased probability of default.  Thus, prompt39
corrective action triggers based on sub-debt yields relative to corporate yields introduce an
element of smoothing into the triggers.  The triggers may be relatively tight during expansions when
banks should be building financial strength and relatively loose during downturns as they draw
down part of their reserves.
One case where the use of sub-debt yields may tend to reinforce the business cycle is when
liquidity drops in all corporate bond markets and risk premiums (including liquidity risk
premiums) temporarily soar.
52   However, our proposal recognizes this potential problem and
provides for temporary relief until liquidity improves.
q  Aren’t supervisors better gauges of the riskiness of a bank because they know more about
each bank’s exposure than does the market? If so, then why not rely exclusively on the
supervisors instead of holders of sub-debt? 
In some cases the market’s knowledge of a bank’s exposure may indeed be a subset of the
examiner’s knowledge.  However, we rely on markets to discipline firm risk taking in virtually
every other sector of our economy, so markets must have some offsetting advantages.  One such
advantage is that the financial markets are likely to be better able to price the risks they observe
because market prices reflect the consensus of many observers investing their own funds. Another
advantage of markets is that they can avoid limitations inherent in any type of government
supervision.  Supervisors are rightfully reluctant to be making fundamental business decisions for
banks unless or until results confirm the bank is becoming unsafe or unsound.  Further, even when
supervisors recognize a serious potential problem, they have the burden of being able to prove to a
court that a bank is engaged in unsafe activities. In contrast, in financial markets the burden of
proof is on the bank to show it is being safely managed. A further weakness of relying solely on
bank supervisors is that they are ultimately accountable to the political system which suggests that
noneconomic factors may enter into major decisions no matter how hard supervisors try to focus
solely on the economics of a bank’s position.
53  Sub-debt investors have no such accountability;
they may be expected to focus solely on the economic condition of individual banks. 
A typical concern surrounding sub-debt proposals is that the perceived intent is to supplant
supervisors and rely solely on the forces of the marketplace to oversee bank behavior.  In our40
proposal, the intent is to augment, not reduce supervisory oversight.  If supervisors have additional
information about the condition of a bank, there is nothing in the sub-debt proposals limiting their
ability to impose sanctions on the activities of the bank.  In addition to sub-debt serving the
standard role as a loss absorbing capital cushion, it serves as an additional tool for use by both the
private markets and the regulators to objectively discipline banks. In fact, one of the major
components of our proposal was to have the supervisors incorporate the yield spreads for use in
prompt corrective action.  With private markets providing information, supervisors can focus their
efforts on exceptional circumstances, leaving the well-understood risks for assessment by the
marketplace.
q  Can’t the case be made that sub-debt is inferior to equity? 
An alternative argument against greater reliance on sub-debt is that the same benefits, plus
additional ones could be obtained by relying exclusively on equity.  For example, Levonian (1999)
argues that (1) each dollar of increased equity will generate the same discipline as an additional
dollar of sub-debt, (2) sub-debt is not a superior source of information about bank condition
because market participants and regulators may use equity prices to infer the same information
(thus, there is not difference in the extent of derived discipline), and (3) equity is more desirable
because it can absorb losses without forcing the closure of the bank.  These arguments have some
theoretical merit, but are not nearly as strong in practice. 
Levonian’s argument that additional equity can generate as much direct discipline as a
comparable amount of sub-debt is correct under certain circumstances.   In some cases equity-
holders benefit from increased risk exposure because they receive all of the benefits, but bear only
part of the losses if the bank should become insolvent. Sub-debt generates direct discipline by
adjusting the bank’s cost of funds to offset changes in the risk borne by sub-debt-holders and,
thereby making equity-holders bear more of the expected losses resulting from failure.  Indeed, if
the closure rule is independent of a bank’s equity level then equal increases in outstanding equity
and sub-debt will have the same effect on the proportion of losses in failure borne by equity-
holders. The key to this result is that sub-debt-holders as well as equity-holders face limited
liability.  Thus, just as equity-holders do not demand compensation for risks they do not bear, sub-41
debt-holders similarly do not demand compensation for risks they do not bear.
One weaknesses of Levonian’s arguments on direct discipline is the assumption of a fixed
closure rule; that is, the value of assets is assumed to be random and the bank will be kept open,
regardless of its condition, until time T at which time it can be closed.  As such, his analysis is
incapable of fully analyzing the merits of many sub-debt proposals, including ours, that are
partially or wholly justified on the grounds that regulators have an incentive to engage in
forbearance towards financially weak banks.  These proposals advocate the use of sub-debt with
mandatory triggers for regulatory action to limit bank regulators’ ability to engage in forbearance.
Moreover, if sub-debt is used to trigger regulatory action and this leads to reduced forbearance
then that would have the desirable side effect of increasing the effectiveness of the direct
discipline from both equity and sub-debt-holders. Equity-holders’ incentive to take additional risk
arises in large part because the bank’s owners retain virtually all of the gains from successful, high
risk ventures, but the safety net absorbs a large fraction of the losses.  If the probability of
forbearance is reduced then so is the probability that equity-holders may gain at the expense of the
safety net.
An additional weakness of Levonian’s argument on direct discipline is that it ignores the
tax benefit of debt. One of Horvitz’s arguments in favor of increased sub-debt requirements is that
regulators could impose higher sub-debt requirements than they would impose on equity because
of the cost advantages of sub-debt.  Thus, Levonian’s comparison of a bank issuing equal amounts
of equity or sub-debt may understate the amount of discipline that would be generated by a plan
that increases the role of sub-debt.
54    Furthermore, even if regulators do not impose higher capital
requirements, banks' expected after tax earnings will be higher if they are allowed to issue debt
rather than equity.
Levonian’s finding that debt and equity provide equally good signals of a bank’s risk
exposure also collapses when we recognize some real world features that are not in his model. He
builds his case by modeling subordinated debt as a contingent claim on the bank’s assets and
showing that, like equity-holders, debt-holders may also benefit from increased risk taking. He
acknowledges that one important assumption of his analysis is that in constructing the model, one
must know what investors assume about the rules used by regulators to determine when a bank will42
be closed.  Without this knowledge, the size of the safety net subsidy impounded in equity prices
cannot be inferred and, thus, neither can the value of the bank absent the safety net. The result could
be that regulators could infer that a bank was solvent when it is actually insolvent, and vice versa.
A second, unacknowledged assumption is that in constructing the model one must also
know the statistical process generating bank returns and the model parameters must be accurately
estimated using historical data.  Losses sufficiently large to generate bank failure are relatively
rare events or, in the terms used in Value at Risk (VaR) analyses, are tail events.  VaR analysis is
used to estimate the largest loss on bank market risk portfolios that could occur with a given
probability.  However, the results from analyzing different VaR models suggest that their results
are sensitive to the statistical distribution of the returns and the method used to estimate the
parameters from historical data.
55   Both the statistical process generating bank portfolio returns
and the parameters of that distribution must be estimated from stock return data in order to obtain
information about a bank’s probability of failure.  Significant errors in estimating either may
translate into large errors in estimating a bank’s risk of failure.
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The problems with model error are especially severe in interpreting equity returns and
prices because the relationship between risk and equity prices is likely to be non-monotonic.  That
is, over some ranges equity prices may decline in response to an increase in risk, especially if the
risk is not adequately compensated for by higher expected returns.  However, over other, higher
risk ranges, a similar uncompensated increase in risk may lead to higher stock prices.  Why is the
relationship not monotonic?  At lower levels of risk, any increase in risk will be borne almost
entirely by equity-holders and they may respond to the higher risk by bidding down the firm's stock
price.  However, at higher levels of risk, most of the increase in risk of losses will be borne by
creditors, whereas equity-holders will obtain most of the gains and, therefore, will bid up the
firms’ stock price.
57   Thus, merely observing an increase in equity returns is not sufficient to
determine whether a bank has become more or less risky.  In order to interpret the returns, one
must have an accurate model of bank portfolio returns.
In contrast, over the normal range of bank operations, an increase in risk will
unambiguously lead to lower sub-debt prices.
58    Supervisors would need the correct model of
bank portfolio returns to obtain all of the information embedded in sub-debt prices.  However, the43
monotonicity of the relationship implies that an increase in sub-debt risk premiums is almost
certainly associated with an increase in a bank's risk.
59   Moreover, if the yield on sub-debt is at
rates comparable to other credits rated “A” then all of the other bank's liabilities must similarly be
no more risky than "A" because sub-debt is junior to all other debt.
A further practical problem with using equity prices arises if supervisors seek to focus on
the riskiness of the bank, since that is the entity covered by the safety net. In the U.S., all large
banks are virtually 100 percent owned by holding companies and do not have publicly traded
stock.  One possible reason for this is that the existence of minority shareholders at the bank level
would inhibit managers’ ability to operate the bank and its affiliates as a single entity.  Thus, the
regulators may be imposing substantial costs on holding companies if they require the subsidiary
banks to issue publicly traded stock.  In contrast, while most of the publicly traded sub-debt that is
issued by banking organizations is issued by the holding company, a significant amount of traded
sub-debt is also issued by the bank subsidiaries; and as noted above, this amount has increased in
recent years.  That some banks issue publicly traded sub-debt suggests that while the costs of
issuing debt at the bank level may be greater than issuing at the holding company level, the cost
difference may not be very large.
Finally, Levonian’s analysis of the relative merits of increased equity and sub-debt in
reducing the risk of failure relies on the argument that sub-debt will not generate additional direct
discipline or provide superior risk signals.  If sub-debt provides superior risk signals that may be
used for derived supervisory discipline then a system relying on regulatory sub-debt requirements
may be more effective at reducing the probability of failure than a system relying on equity.  As
argued in our proposal, the regulators may be able to use sub-debt yields in combination with
prompt corrective action to encourage banks to reduce their risk of failure by setting the prompt
corrective action triggers at yields comparable to highly rated firms.  Thus, if further reducing the
probability of failure is an important regulatory goal then the use of sub-debt yields as prompt
corrective action triggers is more likely to be effective.
Thus, the argument that sub-debt is merely an inferior form of equity does not hold under
closer analysis.  Sub-debt does not have magical powers and higher equity levels do provide some
discipline.  However, the tax benefits of sub-debt reduce the cost of the debt relative to equity and44
imply that the regulators may impose higher total capital requirements if sub-debt is an important
part of the mix.  Furthermore, sub-debt may provide a useful signal about the riskiness of a bank’s
other liabilities even in the absence of a formal model of bank portfolio returns.  In contrast, equity
prices may be interpreted only in the context of a specific model, a model that will almost surely
be wrong.  Thus, sub-debt is superior both in providing information to regulators and as a trigger
that limits regulatory forbearance.
q  Won’t banks attempt to circumvent sub-debt discipline?
Banks may be reasonably expected to minimize their costs of production, including the
costs of complying with supervisory requirements.  If the sub-debt is used to help enforce
discipline, banks will seek to minimize those costs just as they currently seek to minimize the costs
associated with meeting the capital requirements.  This involves efforts to reduce both direct and
derived discipline.  Banks may reduce the burden of direct discipline by minimizing the amount of
debt they are required to issue.  They can reduce the effectiveness of both direct and derived
discipline by minimizing the rate they pay on the debt.45
Banks will attempt to minimize the amount of required sub-debt in the same way they
currently reduce their capital requirements; by exploiting inaccuracies in the measurement of their
risk exposure.  Indeed, the problems with setting appropriate sub-debt requirements are identical
to the problems with setting appropriate Tier 1 and total capital requirements under existing
capital regulations. Consequently, the gains in direct discipline from sub-debt may be limited and
may yield little more direct discipline than would result from an increase in the current capital
requirements.  Although efforts are ongoing to improve the regulatory risk measures used in the
capital standards, we are not particularly sanguine about the near term prospects for the
development of reliable, accurate measures of risk from direct analysis of bank portfolios.  The
problems of accurately measuring risk are likely to be especially severe for the banks the
regulators are most concerned about, financially weak ones.  Thus, while our proposal seeks to
enhance direct discipline, it does not rely exclusively on this to discipline banks’ risk exposure. 
As additional expertise is developed, it may be possible to place greater reliance on direct
discipline in the future.
Banks may try to avoid derived discipline based on sub-debt yields by minimizing the rate
they pay on sub-debt by misleading investors about the condition of the bank.  However, again, this
is not new.  Banks currently have incentives to mislead investors (for example, to boost their stock
price, or pay lower interest on current sub-debt or certificate of deposits).  In fact, a variety of
regulatory measures have been taken to reduce banks’ ability to mislead; perhaps the most
important of these being the disclosure and audit requirements imposed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on issuers of publicly traded securities.  Bank regulators also require
banking organizations to file financial statements and have on-site examinations during which the
accuracy of the statements can be evaluated. 
The ability of market participants to evaluate bank risk exposures given existing disclosure
requirements may be seen from the performance of bank securities around the time of disclosures
related to Latin American loan problems in the 1980s.  Banks were not required to disclose
lending by country at the start of these problems and refused to recognize the extent of the losses on
their financial statements for several years.  Nevertheless, several studies, most recently
Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a, 1990b) find evidence that investors were able to determine which46
banks were most at risk early in the crisis.  Moreover, when banks finally recognized the loan
losses in their financial statements the markets interpreted this as good news, suggesting that bank
stock prices had already discounted the losses associated with the loans.
Derived discipline depends on the ability of bank regulators and other market participants
to observe market prices that accurately reflect the riskiness of issuing banks.  Financially troubled
banks may try to reduce the sensitivity of market prices by encouraging related parties to buy the
debt at artificially high prices.  While this course may be tempting to banks facing significant
regulatory sanctions, successful deception is likely to be limited.  The investors, the rating
agencies and the regulators are all likely to notice big discrepancies between observed sub-debt
prices and prices that fairly reflect the riskiness of the bank.
q  Do we currently know enough about the sub-debt market to proceed?
Although we would like to know more about the sub-debt market, we think considerable
information is already available.  The studies surveyed and the new evidence presented in Kwast
et al. provide considerable insight into the sub-debt market.  These studies suggest that investors in
sub-debt do discriminate on the basis of the riskiness of their portfolios.
Moreover, a review of the regulatory alternatives suggests that any durable solution to
achieving an objective measure of banks’ risk exposure will look something like our proposal. 
The problems that plague the existing risk-based capital guidelines are inherent in any attempt by
the supervisors to measure the riskiness of a bank’s portfolio based on a pre-specified set of
criteria.  Overtime, banks will find or will manufacture claims whose intrinsic contribution to the
riskiness of the bank’s portfolio is underestimated by the supervisory criteria.
60  That is, banks will
attempt to arbitrage the capital requirements.
An alternative to supervisory determined criteria is to use market evaluations. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision correctly moved in this direction with its proposed new
capital adequacy framework.  However, it chose to ask opinions of market participants rather than
observing market prices and quantities.  The Committee then compounded this by proposing to ask
the opinions of the two parties, the banks and their rating agencies, with incentives to
underestimate the true risk exposure.47
A superior system for obtaining a market based risk measure will use observed data from
financial markets on price or quantity, or both. That is, it will use a market test. The relevant
question to be addressed is which instruments should be observed, how should these instruments
be structured, and how can supervisors best extract the risk signal from the noise generated by
other factors that may influence observed prices and quantities.  In principle, any uninsured bank
obligation can provide the necessary information.  We favor sub-debt because we think it will
provide the cleanest signal. 
There are alternatives to sub-debt.  Common equity may currently have the advantages of
being issued by all large banks and of trading in more liquid markets.  However, investors in bank
common equity will sometimes bid up stock prices in response to greater risk taking so their
signal can only be interpreted in the context of a model that backs the option value of putting the
bank back to the firm’s creditors (including the deposit insurer).   In contrast, valuable information
can be extracted from sub-debt without a complicated model.  If a bank’s debt trades at prices
equivalent to Baa corporate bonds then its other liabilities are at least Baa quality.
Banks also issue a variety of other debt obligations that could be used to measure their risk
exposure.
61    The use of any debt obligation that was explicitly excluded from the systemic risk
exception in FDICIA could provide a superior risk measure to those proposed by the Basel
Committee.  We think that sub-debt is the best choice because it is the least senior of all debt
obligations if a bank should fail and, therefore, its yields provide the clearest signal about the
potential risk that the bank will fail.  We think sufficient information exists to adopt a sub-debt
proposal with the understanding that the plan will be refined and made more effective as
additional information and analyses becomes available.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this article has been to provide a comprehensive review and evaluation of
bank capital reform proposals that incorporate a mandatory sub-debt component. Toward that goal,
we provided the arguments behind capital proposals incorporating sub-debt, and emphasized that
the stated objective of the capital program should dictate which of the characteristics are included.
We then reviewed the evidence on the extent of market pricing of risk and the direct discipline48
imposed by holders of bank liabilities and briefly summarized some of the existing sub-debt
proposals emphasizing their differences and the reasoning for those differences.  Next, we
presented a new sub-debt proposal which incorporates many of the characteristics, and resulting
advantages, described in the early sections of this article, as well as some new characteristics.
Finally we responded to some of the common issues raised about the potential viability of sub-
debt proposals.
We conclude that although legislative and regulatory reform during the 1990s attempted to
properly align the incentives of both banks and bank supervisors, ongoing market developments
are undercutting the effectiveness of both market and supervisory discipline.  Arguably, the
potential for systemic risk has increased in recent years as banks have grown larger and more
complex.  Unquestionably, banks’ ability to game the regulatory risk measures has grown
significantly over the same period.
We argue that a well structured sub-debt program provides a viable mechanism for
providing increased market and supervisory discipline in banking.  While markets do not have
perfect foresight, they are both flexible enough to accept promising innovations and willing to
acknowledge their mistakes, even if such recognition is politically inconvenient.  Sub-debt is
already proving to provide workable signals in today’s financial markets.   We propose to
combine these signals with the gradual discipline provided under prompt corrective action with a
goal of augmenting supervisory oversight with market-based discipline.
Our sub-debt proposal is couched within the existing evidence on market discipline in
banking and draws on the insights of previous proposals and policy changes. It provides for
phased implementation and leaves room for future modifications as additional details concerning
the market for sub-debt are determined.  The plan calls for specific changes in those areas were
we feel confident the evidence is relatively clear, such as the fact that large solvent banks should
be able to issue sub-debt at least once a year.  In those areas where the evidence is weak to non-
existent, we defer decisions until additional study has taken place.  This should enhance the
credibility of the plan. Although the details of the plan can evolve over time, once the basics are
implemented the industry and the public would have the benefit of having bank behavior be
significantly influenced by both market and supervisory oversight.   The effective combination49
should make for a more efficient, safe and sound industry.50
ENDNOTES
1. See Title 1, Section 108 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
2. For a relatively recent discussion of this issue see Stern (1992).
3. Alternatives include eliminating or lowering deposit insurance coverage (Volcker 1985),
privatizing deposit insurance (England 1985, Ely 1985), introducing co-insurance programs in
which publicly provided deposit insurance would be heavily augmented with private insurance
coverage (Baer 1985, Stern 1988,1997), as well as returning deposit insurance to the de jure
levels and encouraging regulatory discipline to mimic market discipline through some form of
structured early intervention by supervisors (Benston and Kaufman 1988a, 1988b, 1994).
4. Kane’s (1977) analysis suggests that any binding regulation will elicit avoidance behavior by
firms. Numerous empirical studies of banking support his contention; e.g., Pyle (1974),  Startz
(1979), Brewer (1988), Evanoff (1988).
5. For example, see Carey and Hrycay (2000).
6. Some would argue it was an explicit guarantee as a result of Comptroller of the Currency
Conover’s comments surrounding the Continental of Illinois reorganization in the 1980s; see
O’Hare and Shaw (1990).
7. For example, see Caprio, Hunter, Kaufman and Leipziger (1998).
8. A key assumption in the argument that shareholders prefer more risk is that they may diversify
across many companies so that their losses from the failure of any given firm is a small proportion
of their total wealth.  A firm's managers are likely to have a substantially larger part of their
wealth invested in the firm, especially when the manager's human capital is included in wealth. 
Thus, managers may be more risk averse than are shareholders and may have an incentive to take
less than the optimal amount of risk.  However, equity-holders are likely to recognize the
manager's incentives and to encourage managers (through additional compensation) to take more
risk when the increased risk maximizes the value of the firm's equity. Noe, Rebello and Wall
(1996) provide an example of how such compensation would work for banks.
9. See Buser, Chen and Kane (1981). 
10. In contrast, if a firm issues long term debt and the debt matures after the investment is
completed, then the firm may take on relatively high-risk projects before debt-holders can respond.
 Firms with long-lived, illiquid assets tend to rely more on long-term debt in part because they
have a greater potential to experience an involuntary increase in their riskiness (such as during a
recession) and want to avoid the additional funding cost short-term debt would impose during
these periods.
11. See section 4 of Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) for a discussion of “systemic risk.” In the51
literature there is disagreement on precisely what constitutes systemic risk and the extent to which
it exists; see Bartholomew and Caprio (1998), Kaufman (1996) and Basing (1993).
12. It should be emphasized that introduction of the safety net did not result in all banks
immediately taking excessive risks.  In most cases the expected gains from excessive risk taking
were less than the expected gains from operating prudently—those being the value of the
government charter and the value of existing intangible assets that would be lost if the bank failed.
 Furthermore, both suppliers of funds and customers may be less likely to commit to long-term
relationships with a bank that has a substantial probability of failing.  However, the distorting
impact of the safety net should not be understated.  As the riskier banks took on additional risk,
they funded those activities by paying more for deposits.  To remain competitive, the banks
choosing not to take on risky projects still had to respond by paying more for funding.  The higher
funding cost might then make riskier investments look more attractive for all banks.
13. For example, dividend payments may become restricted if the bank’s total capital ratio falls
below eight percent.  Interest rates paid on new deposits may be restricted when it falls to six
percent. 
14. See Jones 2000. While the development of more accurate risk models opens up the possibility
for basing regulatory capital requirements on a bank’s internal model, there are problems with
confirming the accuracy of these models.  Measuring the probability of large losses is extremely
difficult, especially for those parts of the bank portfolio that are not traded in liquid financial
markets.  Moreover, the problems are exacerbated in that the very banks that are most likely to
produce models that underestimate their true risk (i.e., financially weak banks) are precisely the
ones that are likely to be of greatest supervisory concern. 
15. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there have recently been statements by U.S. financial
regulators about increasing deposit insurance to $200,000 per account [see Tanoue (2000)].
16. FDICIA discourages such loans.  However, the Federal Reserve is only penalized and not
prohibited from making extended discount window loans to undercapitalized banks.  Additionally,
the FDICIA penalties arise only if the bank is undercapitalized under the regulatory capital
measures.  A bank with market-value capital that is clearly inadequate for its actual risk exposure
may have book value capital that is easily sufficient to cover its risks as measured by existing
regulatory capital measures. For a discussion of potential problems induced by inappropriate
discount window administration see Broaddus (2000).
17. Calomiris (1998) also strongly advocates the advantages of an explicit safety net over an
implicit one. While regulators cannot prevent market participants from assigning positive
probability to the existence of an implicit safety net, the approach currently being taken in the U.S.
towards least cost resolution is likely contributing to the belief that the future use of implicit
guarantees will be uncommon.  Statements by regulatory authorities projecting the end of too-big-
to-fail policies may also contribute to this belief [see Greenspan (2000)].  However, the closure of
a large, complex bank raises a number of difficult questions about the treatment of some of its more
complex activities, such as its derivatives activities.  The market may reasonably conjecture that a52
high probability exists that the systemic risk exception will be invoked in the absence of a
credible, previously announced plan for closing such a bank. Thus, if least cost resolution is to
help generate additional market discipline at the largest and most complex banks, the regulatory
agencies should develop and announce how these banks would be closed without invoking the
system risk exception.
18. With few exceptions we only survey the literature on market discipline in the U.S. A review of
the literature for developing countries is provided in Martinez Peria and Schmukler (1998). A
more comprehensive literature survey of U.S. banking is provided in Kwast, et al. (1999).
19. A risk premia was found in Baer and Brewer (1986), Cargill (1989), Ellis and Flannery
(1992), Hannan and Hanweck (1988), James (1988, 1990), and Keeley (1990). Earlier studies by
Crane (1976), and Herzig-Marx and Weaver (1979) did not find evidence of market discipline.
These earlier studies are reviewed in Gilbert (1990); particularly pp. 13-15. A more recent study
of CD rates is Hall, et al. (1999).
20. These early studies include Beighley (1977), Fraser and McCormack (1978),  Herzig-Marx
(1979), Pettway (1976), Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988), and Gorton and Santomero (1990).
21. Although an analysis of the spread-to-bank-risk relationship was not the expressed purpose of
this study, it was a byproduct.  Rather the purpose was to determine the extent to which bank
examiners could ascertain information about banks beyond that obtained by private market agents. 
Nevertheless, part of the analysis included changes in bank spreads regressed on an array of
balance sheet and market risk measures.
22. For a discussion of the latter argument see Kwast and Passmore (1997).
23. Kane (2000) and Penas and Unal (2000) also question whether too-big-to-fail, and the
resulting implicit guarantees, is exclusively a policy of the past.
24. The authors compute the proportion of the variance explained by the bank risk measures and
find that these variables explain a significant portion of the variance of deposits; a larger portion
in more recent years.  
25. The authors acknowledge that they ignore this aspect of potential influence by debt holders.
Nevertheless, they still draw rather strong policy conclusions.
26. The bank should, of course, consider the impact of the action on its creditors.  However, the
impact on the creditors is important through its affect on the expected profitability of the action to
the firm’s shareholder.
27. See Pilloff (1996) and Pilloff and Santomerro (1997) for a review of the literature on merger
effects.
28. While acquiring another firm may reduce shareholder wealth, such actions are unlikely to53
materially increase a bank’s risk of failure given that bank supervisors must have approved all
acquisitions during the Bliss and Flannery sample period.  Indeed, we have difficulty imagining a
situation where a manager would undertake action that would materially increase a bank’s risk of
failure and simultaneously reduce shareholder wealth.  If the bank fails then the manager lose not
only their investment in the bank’s stock but also any firm specific human capital they may have
developed and they may damage their reputation in the managerial labor market.
29. In this study, and others, the information available to examiners is assumed to be embedded in
the official bank or holding company ratings; i.e., CAMEL or BOPEC ratings.
30. Formally the authors test to see if lagged supervisory variables help predict current market
variables and if lagged market variables help predict current supervisory variables.  They use
Granger causality tests to determine whether information from one group helped ‘predict’ the
assessment of the other group.  The private market assessment used was ratings by Bond Market
Rating agencies.
31. They also found that after taking into account the market assessment of bank condition,
additional supervisory information (BOPEC data) did not contribute significantly to predicting
future bank holding company performance.
32. More generally, in recent years there have been growing concern about the need to increase the
role of market discipline in banking. See, for example, Ferguson (1999), Meyer (1999), Stern
(1998), Boyd and Rolnick (1988), Broaddus (1999), and Moskow (1998).
33. This benefit is not relevant for all countries. Our emphasis is on U.S. banks.
34. Additional discussion of the role of sub-debt in this plan can be found in Evanoff (1993,
1994).
35. Regulatory restrictions would be prompt-corrective-action-type constraints such as limits to
dividend payments, or restrictions on deposit and asset growth rates once core equity fell below
two percent of risk weighted assets. 
36. The sub-debt requirement is only one component of Calomiris’ regulatory reform proposal
aimed at modifying industry structure and the operating procedures of the International Monetary
Fund.  It would also include a mandatory minimum reserve requirement (20 percent of bank debt in
Calomiris (1998)), minimum securities requirement, and explicit deposit insurance. Although some
details of his proposal, such as requiring the debt be issued to foreign banks, may not be feasible
for U.S. banks, the general approach provides interesting insights into the issues in designing a
sub-debt plan for the U.S.
37. This is not the first time proposals have suggested sub-debt be linked with prompt corrective
action, see Evanoff (1993, 1994) and Litan (2000). 
38. The proposal is also discussed in Evanoff and Wall (2000a) and a more detailed description54
of the potential use of debt spreads for prompt corrective action is discussed in Evanoff and Wall
(2000b).
39. As discussed earlier, the current bank capital requirement framework is being reevaluated [see
Bank for International Settlement (1999)].  As part of the debate, some have recommended total
elimination of the Tier 1 versus Tier 2 distinction [e.g., Litan (2000)].  If this approach is taken we
would recommend that minimum leverage requirements be maintained to insure sufficient levels of
equity (although it would be in sub-debt holders self interest to insure this occurs) and to provide
supervisors with an official tool for intervening when equity levels fall to unacceptable levels. 
40. When fully implemented, the policy would apply to ‘banks’ instead of the bank holding
company.  During this surveillance stage, however, information could be gained at both levels.
41. The only exception would occur if general market conditions precluded debt issuance by the
corporate sector (both financial and nonfinancial firms). This exception requires more specific
details, but it would be an industry-wide exception instead of bank-specific.
42. The objective is to limit “regulatory gaming”; see Jones (2000).  Additional minimum
denomination constraints could be imposed to further insure that debt holders are sophisticated
investors [e.g., see U.S. Shadow Regulatory Committee 2000)].
43. Depending on the depth of the secondary market, this time period may need to be extended to a
couple of weeks. Again, the timeframe could be modified as more market information is obtained.
Additionally, to allow for flexibility under extreme conditions, procedures could be introduced by
which the presumption could be overturned given the approval of the FDIC upon request by the
bank’s primary federal supervisor.  The procedures for this exception, however, would be quite
stringent.  It would be somewhat similar to the procedures currently in place for too-big-to-fail
exceptions; e.g., submission of a public document to Congress, etc. 
44. For example, should risk be measured as the spread between the yield on a sub-debt issue and
a comparable maturity U.S. Treasury security? The yield on a bank’s sub-debt versus the yield on
comparable maturity corporate bonds in different ratings classes? Or the spread over Libor after
the bond is swapped into floating rate funds? 
45. This is not to say that the detailed parameters should be introduced at this time.  As argued
above, additional analysis is required before these could be decided upon.
46. Jones (1998) suggests the cost of equity could be twice that of debt once the tax differences are
accounted for.  Benston (1992) discusses the cost differences and other advantages of sub-debt
over equity capital.
47. Alternatively, the current owners could inject equity but that may be costly in that it places
them in a situation where they are relatively undiversified.
48.  See Kwast et al. (1999) for a discussion of current market practices.55
49. This holding company premium is typically associated with the bank having access to the
safety net and the associated lower risk of default during times of financial stress. Alternatively, it
has been argued the differential results from the different standing of the two debt-holders. 
Holders of bank debt have a higher priority claim on the assets during liquidation of the bank than
do the holders of holding company debt, which essentially have an equity claim on the bank.
50. The appendix was prepared by Thomas Brady and William English of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.  Most of the comments in this section attributed to Kwast et al.
come from this appendix. 
51. Arguably, to the extent the capital requirements caused a reduction in bank lending during the
early 1990s, it was because banks were trying to increase their capital ratios due to new
requirements at the same time they were experiencing higher loan losses. A discussion of this
“capital crunch” literature is provided in Hancock and Wilcox (1997, 1998). After banks have
time to rebalance their portfolios in response to new capital requirements they are likely to have a
cushion to absorb the higher loan losses incurred during recessions.  Wall and Peterson (1987,
1995) find evidence that banks seek to maintain capital ratios in excess of regulatory requirements
and speculate that part of the reason for the higher ratios is to absorb unexpected losses.
52. The liquidity crunch in the Fall of 1998, or the Long Term Capital episode, is a possible
example of such a problem period.
53. For example, the American Banker reports that the OCC is threatening to downgrade bank’s
safety and soundness rating if they fail to supply accurate CRA data; see Seiberg (1999).
54. To be fair to Levonian’s analysis, he also assumes that the sub-debt may be continuously
repriced to reflect changes in the bank’s riskiness whereas existing regulatory standards prohibit
any risk-based repricing.  Thus, his analysis also overstates the amount of direct discipline arising
from sub-debt designed to qualify as capital under existing capital standards.
55. See for example Kupiec (1995). The difficulty of identifying the probability of extreme events
with small samples is also highlighted by Christoffersen, Diebold and Schuermann (1998) who
argue that “for performing statistical inference on objects such as a ‘once every hundred years’
quantile, the relevant measure of sample size is likely better approximated by the number of
nonoverlapping hundred-year intervals in the data set than by the actual number of data points.”
56. One way of addressing the problem of determining the regulatory closure rule would be to use
risk measures derived from equity returns to trigger a regulatory response.  However, the use of
such a rule would create a circular feedback from equity prices to regulatory action to equity
prices that would need to be disentangled to properly interpret equity returns.  We conjecture that
if the return generating process and its parameters are known then it may be possible to disentangle
the circular feedback to provide accurate risk measurements.  However, if return generating
process, its parameters, or both, are unknown then using equity prices as a trigger for regulatory
action would likely compound the errors in estimating the bank’s financial condition.56
57. This analysis assumes that debt-holders cannot obtain adequate compensation for the increase
in risk, as is likely to be the case with the existing safety net. 
58. The exception arises when a bank suffers sufficient losses in excess of its equity.  However,
these exceptions should be relatively easy to identify from very high observed sub-debt yields
since investors will likely not be expecting to be repaid in full. 
59. The exception to this occurs when the risk-free interest rate increases or when the liquidity risk
premium substantially increases.  The risk-free rate is readily observable and easy to account for. 
We consider the issues associated with increasing liquidity premiums in the discussion of our sub-
debt proposal. 
60. Supervisor agencies could short-circuit this avoidance by having their examiners conduct
subjective evaluations but that could easily result in examiners serving as shadow managers of
banks.
61. Preferred stock is a form of equity but it would yield a clean signal unlike common equity.  We
do not propose the use of preferred stock for two reasons.  First, dividend payments on preferred stock
are not a deductible expense to the bank. Thus, forcing them to issue preferred stock would increase
their costs.  Second, discussions with market participants, as reported in Kwast et al. (1999, page 45),
indicated that the preferred stock market is more heavily influenced by “relatively uninformed retail
investors.”57
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 inability to run
 meaningful
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 Implicit in the 
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 requirements into
 PCA.
 None.  A variant of the
 proposal would
 require the bank
 issue putable
 subordinated
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 would have 90
 days to issue
 replacement debt.
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 so, it would be
 taken over by the
 regulators.
 Once a bank's debt
 capital fell below the
 required level,
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 be given an equity
 position and would
 have a prescribed
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 This author suggests





 funds for the
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 instruments issued by
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 his conversations
 with small bankers
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 total
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 assets or 2
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 weighted
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 direct or indirect
 interest in the
 stock of the bank
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 suggested that the
 ideal
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 a  yield no
 greater  than 50
 basis  points
 above the
 riskless rate.
 Not discussed.  Sub-debt
 holders must have
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 plan is
 described  as
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 plan for a
 developing
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 Two years.  1/24 of the issue
 would mature each
 month.
 Debt must be




 institutions.  See
 the "All Banks?"
 column for
 details.
 Rates would be
 capped at the 
 one-year
 Treasury bill rate
 plus a "maximum
 spread" (say, 3
 percent.)
 Not discussed.  Banks that could not
 issue would be
 required to shrink
 their assets by 1/24
 (4.17%) during the
 next month.  If
 additional
 contraction is
 required (because of
 prior growth) then
 the additional
 shrinkage could be
 achieved over three




 using a three month
 moving average.) 
 Presumably, this
 would result in the
 bank liquidating all
 of its assets over 24
 to 27 months if it
 could no longer issue
 SND.
 The plan would
 apply to all banks. 
 Debt issued by small
 banks (those that




 markets) could be
 held by large
 domestic or foreign
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 2 percent of
 assets and off-
 balance sheet
 commitments
 Must have a
 remaining
 maturity of at
 least one year
 to qualify.
 If the debt traded
 frequently enough,
 secondary market
 prices would be
 adequate for 
 signals to both the
 market and
 regulators.  If the
 debt does not trade
 frequently in
 secondary markets,
 the bank would be
 required to make
 regular offerings in
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 The debt should
 be of “minimum
 remaining
 maturity (say,
 one year), would
 be held at arm’s
 length, and could
 not be repaid by
 the government
 or the FDIC.  It
 could not be
 collateralized,
 and there would
 be a prohibition
 on its repayment
 in the event other
 uninsured debts
 were protected
 by  the FDIC.




 proceeds from a
 new debt issue
 of  at least equal
 size  are realized.
 Typically the
 market may
 “cap” yields on
 the debt through
 credit rationing. 
 An imposed cap
 may also
 occasionally be
 necessary.  If for
 three consecutive
 months the yield
 on the debt of a






 bank would be in
 violation of its
 sub-debt
 requirement.
 No.  Sub-debt
 holders must have
 their money at stake
 when a bank
 becomes insolvent.
 Large banks. Initially
 this would be defined 
 as banks with assets
 greater than $10 billion. 
 Over time, the size
 threshold may be
 lowered.
Source: The bulk of the information and the format are from Table 1 of Kwast, et al. (1999).  Some marginal adjustments have been made and recent entries have been added.